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JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA NORMALISATION: 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 
1NTR0DUCTION1 
Normalisation between Japan and the Republic of Korea was under 
negotiation from 1951 and took fourteen years to be concluded, in 1965. 
During this period, the political, strategic and economic situations in 
both Japan and the Republic of Korea changed dramatically. The 
Korean regime changed three times while five Japanese governments 
came and went. 
The most commonly accepted interpretation of the forces supporting 
the finalisation of the normalisation treaty is that United States East 
Asian (Cold War) policy was the dominant driving force behind its 
conclusion. Bruce Cumings states that in the 1960s, the United States 
"placed strong pressures on Japan and its near neighbours (especially 
South Korea) to restore Japan's economic influence in the region. This 
resulted in the normalisation of relations between Korea and Japan in 
1965".2 
1 The footnote style used below has been developed according to the principles 
enunciated in the Style Manual for Authors, Editors and Printers (4th edition) i.e. that the style 
be simple, consistent and provide the necessary information. In the absence of faculty and 
university guidelines, the style followed is basically that detailed in Chapter 9 of the Style 
Manual adapted in the following ways: (1) To provide consistency between European, Korean 
and Japanese names, all names are listed with family name first, including those embedded as 
secondary references; (2) Punctuation conventions have differed for the three name groups in 
that only European names have followed the punctuation guidelines of the Style Manual, 
with the other two name groups not having a comma between the family name and subsidiary 
names; (3) Japanese publishing house titles have an initial capital only eg. Nihon keizai 
shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1978; (4) Japanese and Korean words used in the general text (i.e. excluding 
proper nouns), are italicised. 
2 Cumings, Bruce, 'The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked 
Witch of the East', in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, ed Hogan, 
Michael J. , Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, p. 96; Also see Chang Young-Gil, The 
Normalization of Relations Between Japan and Korea and the Role of the United States East 
Asian Policy, U.M.I. Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, 1975. Chang argues that the changing 
international environment and American pressure made South Korea and Japan aware of the 
urgency to finalise the normalisation negotiations and therefore brought early rapprochement. 
1 
Id 
Ir• 
It 
I 
,1 
·~ 
~ 
'j I ~
. I 
I 
, 
I 
Many Japanese academics also stressed the importance of the security 
issue; especially the role of the United States. Hatada Shigeo argues that 
the normalisation issue was one of the strategies adopted by the United 
States for strengthening the Japan-United States security alliance, and 
that American influence was significant in playing an intermediary 
role between Japan and the Republic of Korea.3 The assumptions on 
which this argument are based seem to be; (1) by being strategically 
aligned and significantly economically dependent upon American aid 
and trade, Japanese and South Korean policies were dominated by the 
United States East Asian (Cold War) policy; (2) governments in Japan 
and Republic of Korea were the sole actors in the negotiations; and, (3) 
The history of Japan-Korea relations and domestic politics and policies 
in the two countries were not as significant enough influences to 
counter-balance United States East Asian policy in promoting the 
negotiations.4 
These assumptions do not fully explain the indigenous interests and 
the factors promoting the negotiations which were derived from the 
historical aspects of the bilateral relationship. In particular, the last 
assumption is itself questionable and appears to be derived from 
analysis which are predominantly concerned with strategic issues and, 
possibly, a perspective which discounts the power of domestic policy 
issues. Some of the articles written from the Korean perspective on 
this issue argue that the South Korean regime change in 1960 
eliminated the strong anti-Japanese stance of the Republic of Korea's 
This dominance of Japanese policy by the United States is also argued in Barnds, William J. 
'Old Issues in a New Context', in ed Barnds, William J., The Two Koreas and the Role of the 
United States East Asian Policy, New York University Press, New York, 1976, p. 12. He states 
that "Japanese foreign policy has been the alliance with the United States, and the government 
does not want to work at cross-purposes with Washington". 
3 Hatada Shigeo, '"Nikkan Joyaku" wa zenzen gunjiteki shikisai o motanai ka', in 
Chosen Kenkya, vol. 42, August 1965, pp. 10-14 
4 Chang, op.cit. He states that the historical aspects of Japan-South Korea relations could 
only been seen as a major obstacle for normalisation, not a factor which promoted the 
negotiations. 
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former negotiating position.5 Memoirs of the Korean negotiators and 
minutes of the negotiating round released by the Republic of Korea 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs which verify this shift have been 
published.6 There are not as yet, on the other hand, any publications 
which specifically present Japanese perspectives on the negotiations,? 
thus making it quite difficult to obtain a clear understanding of the 
significant influences on the Japanese negotiating position. 
Evaluating the Japanese perspectives on the normalisation issue, and 
the negotiations which concluded the treaty, seems necessary for a 
more balanced view of the process and its determinants. This thesis, 
therefore, focuses on those Japanese perspectives which influenced the 
negotiating position of the Japanese government and has attempted to 
identify, in particular, domestic policy influences. 
5 Nakagawa Nobuo, Chosen mondai eno kihonteki shikaku, Tabata shoten, Tokyo, 1976. 
He argues that the anti-Japanese posture of the Rhee regime meant that the negotiations 
would not have been successful until its demise. 
6 Kim Dong-Jo was involved in the negotiations from the beginning to the end. His 
memoir seems to be regarded as accurate since his work is cited by ex-Japanese Foreign 
Ministry official Morita Yoshio, see Kim Dong-Jo, Nikkan kosho 14 nen no kiroku,, trans. 
Hayashi Takehiko, Simul shuppankai, Tokyo, 1993; see also, Sasaki Ryuji, 'Imakoso nikkan 
joyaku no minaoshi o', Sekai, April 1993, pp. 120-136. Sasaki briefly outlines important points 
in the record of the negotiation talks by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. This 
ministry also published The Korean View of Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Asian Policy, 
in September 1957. This latter document could not be obtained for this research. 
7 Maeda Toshikazu, 'Nikkan kokko seijyoka mae no jitsujo', in Keizai to gaiko, July 1985, 
pp. 2-11. Maeda Toshikazu was one of the few Japanese Foreign Ministry officials who dealt 
with the negotiations all the way through. However, this article is very short and does not 
cover Japanese perspectives comprehensively. Another publication by a Japanese Foreign 
Ministry official is; Morita Yoshio, 'Nikkan kokko seijoka kosho' in Nippon korea tokuhon, eds 
Hayashi Takehiko, and Abe Yo, Kyoiku kaihatsu kenkyusho, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 267-279. He 
extensively uses material by the Foreign Ministry and others, but this is also a very short article 
and does not mention Japanese perspectives on the negotiating position; Lee Chong-sik argues 
that the economic interests of Japan and South Korea were the significant factors in the 
conclusion of the treaty, but does not mention the impact of United States East Asian policy; 
see Lee Chong-sik, Sengo nikkan kankeishi, trans. Okonogi Masao and Furuta Hiroshi, Chu.kc 
sosho, Tokyo, 1989. Also, Ishikawa mainly focuses on the military issue: he states that the 
negotiations were not only pursued to meet the aims of United States East Asian policy and for 
American economic benefit, but also in response to pressure from the Shin-kan group (A pro-
South Korean lobby), which perceived South Korea as the front line of Japanese defence; see, 
Ishikawa Shigeru et al., 'Nikkan kosho no kihonteki saikento', Sekai, April 1964, p. 20. This 
point is also stressed by Hatada; see, Hatada Takashi et al, 'Nikkan kaidan no rekishi', in Ajia 
afurika koza III nihon to chosen, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keiso shobo, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 49-87 
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Japanese perspectives are evaluated on two levels; (1) official Japanese 
East Asian foreign policy; and (2) domestic policy perspectives. The 
reasons for looking at both foreign and domestic policy and 
perspectives is that; (1) Japanese East Asian policy itself might have 
conflicted with United States East Asian policy, thus placing in more 
perspective the real influence of American East Asian policy; and, (2) 
domestic policy perspectives in Japan might have significantly 
influenced the negotiating position of the government. Therefore, the 
influence of both Japanese foreign policy and domestic perspectives on 
the negotiating position of the Japanese government during the course 
of the normalisation treaty negotiations is examined. 
The transnational approach to international relations offers a basis for 
this analytical position. It is different from the once dominant 
paradigms of international relations theory, such as state-centric 
theory, in that this approach emphasises the role of domestic policy in 
the making of foreign policy8 as well as looking at the significant role 
of non-state activities in international relations.9 This is the approach 
pursued by this study. 
This thesis hypothesises that Japanese perspectives, as demonstrated 
through Japanese East Asian policy and various domestic policy 
perspectives, were equally important as United States East Asian policy 
in determining the nature of the negotiations for, and conclusion of, 
the Japan-Republic of Korea Normalisation Treaty. 
8 Morse, E. Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations, Free 
Press, New York, 1976 
9 Keohane, R. and Nye, J ., Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1972 
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RESEARCH METI-IODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on a comprehensive analysis of the literature, 
mainly of the Japanese language literature, concerned with the 
normalisation issue. Much of that literature was obtained during a 
fieldwork visit to the National Diet Library in Tokyo and through a 
number of other libraries in Japan during and following the fieldwork 
visit. For primary sources, interviews were conducted with those 
surviving Japanese diplomats who dealt with the normalisation treaty 
negotiations. Since most of them are quite old, the surviving ones 
being mostly in their mid 80s and some of them unwell, not all could 
be interviewed. Of the fourteen Japanese Foreign Ministry officials 
identified as key members of the Japanese negotiating teams over the 
course of the negotiations, two had died and, of the other twelve, six 
agreed to cooperate with the research.10 Initially, a general 
questionnaire11 was sent to all the targeted ex-negotiators with a letter 
of request. For those who agreed to be interviewed, personalised 
questionnaires, which were individually designed to reflect each 
person's role and participation in the negotiation process12, were sent. 
Some only agreed to a telephone interview and some accepted both a 
telephone interview and a questionnaire. All respondents participated 
on condition of confidentiality and are therefore cited by number 
rather than name. Also, a request was made to search Japanese Foreign 
Ministry files relating to the normalisation treaty. Unfortunately, all 
related files are still closed, possibly because of their perceived 
relationship to the normalisation talks still being conducted between 
Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).13 
10 
11 
12 
See Appendix 1 
See Appendix 2 
See Appendix 3 
13 Confidential Source #3 said that the Japanese Foreign Ministry is currently sensitive 
about the Japanese stance and approach taken on the normalisation negotiations with the 
DPRK which have been continuing since November 1990; also, the relevant files of the 
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Australian diplomatic files held in the Australian Archives were also 
searched, but of the files available, no material of significance could be 
located. Since the primary sources were limited, secondary materials 
are extensively used. Of these, many of the journals concerned with 
the normalisation treaty were written either from a pro-government 
position or a critical position which strongly opposed normalisation.14 
Accordingly, particular care was taken when using materials with a 
strong political bias. 
The Japanese negotiating position in this thesis is defined so as to 
include negotiations by ruling party politicians and bureaucrats, in 
both formal round talks and in the preparatory negotiations for the 
opening of each round of talks. 
DELIMITATIONS 
This thesis only focuses on the factors which influenced the 
negotiating position of the Japanese government from the beginning 
of the negotiations until the treaty was concluded. Also, the re-
evaluation of Japanese East Asian policy, the Republic of Korea's 
policies and United States foreign policy are limited to those policies 
related to, or directly impacting on, the normalisation issue and, in 
particular, their influence on the negotiating position of successive 
Japanese governments . 
Finance Ministry are still closed. For example, Okurasho rizaikyoku gaisaika hen, Nikkan 
seikyaken mondai sanko shiryo, Vol.1 and 2, are still unpublished. 
14 For example, Gendai no me is rather leftist, while Sekai janaru is more pro-
government. 
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MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The major research questions addressed by this thesis are: 
1. Was Japanese East Asian policy similar to that of the United _States? 
Did these two policies have any conflicts of interest and, if so, how 
did this influence the Japanese negotiating position? 
2. In what way did the United States East Asian policy influence the 
Japanese negotiating position, if at all? 
3. What was the major objective for the Japanese government in 
normalising relations with the Republic of Korea? How important 
was the normalisation issue in achieving the goals of Japan's East 
Asian policy? How were the East Asian policies of Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and the United States reflected in the negotiating 
position of the Japanese government? 
4. What were the significant influences of Japanese domestic 
perspectives on the Japanese negotiating position? How were the 
interests of individuals and interest groups such as politicians, 
political factions, political parties, bureaucrats, business, 
intellectuals and community groups reflected? 
This thesis examines the East Asian policies of the United States, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, evaluates the influences of those policies on 
the treaty process and then places this in the context of the impact of 
Japanese domestic policy perspectives on the normalisation issues. 
Prior to the analysis, roles of bureaucrats and politicians in 
policymaking is overviewed. 
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS 
DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS 
This discussion of the Japanese policymaking process and its effects on 
the negotiations will be necessarily brief. The purpose is to 
demonstrate the major roles of politicians and senior bureaucrats in 
influencing the treaty negotiation process. 
In order fully to understand the treaty negotiation process and the 
changing dynamics of the Japanese government's position in this 
series of negotiations, it is necessary briefly to overview the way policy 
was made during the period of the normalisation negotiations. The 
dynamics of the policy process, particularly the changing locus of policy 
control by politicians and bureaucrats, greatly influenced the way in 
which the Japanese negotiations were conducted. 
This section analyses; 1) the relationships between bureaucrats and 
politicians; 2) whence the bureaucrats and politicians derived their 
power; and 3) how Japanese bureaucrats and politicians functioned at 
the time. 
During the normalisation negotiations, political interest often 
coincided with bureaucratic interest, but sometimes these interests 
were in conflict. Politician-bureaucrat relations were complicated by 
the strong linkages established between politicians of the Liberal 
Democratic Party conservative faction and bureaucrats. A large 
numbers of ex-bureaucrats joined the conservative faction of the LDP 
and maintained strong links with the ministries with which they 
previously served.15 The influence of ex-bureaucrats in the LDP was 
15 Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-
1975, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1982, p. 46 
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significant, but not sufficient to control the political agenda completely. 
Politicians did not dominate policy making either. Muramatsu and 
Krauss point out that the introduction of a democratic political system 
in postwar Japan did not necessarily establish the status and power of 
politician over the bureaucracy.16 
There are three major views of politician-bureaucrat relations in 
postwar Japan; 1) the dominance of bureaucrats over politicians, 2) 
mutually supportive relations between bureaucrats and politicians; 
and, 3) the limitation of bureaucratic power by political power. 
The first view is shared by Japan specialists who focus on the economic 
policy making process, such as Chalmers Johnson, and by those who 
believe that Japanese culture shaped bureaucratically oriented politics . 
Johnson argues for the dominance of the bureaucracy in Japan by 
pointing out that bureaucratic recommendations are almost free of 
constraint by politicians unless they clearly show the possibility of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) losing votes. 17 Okimoto argues that 
bureaucrats controlled politics through joining the Liberal Democratic 
Party on a large scale. 18 This constant flow of senior bureaucrats from 
the civil service to the LDP produced a class of 'bureaucratised' 
politicians who had an intimate understanding of public policy and 
who exercised State power at both a political and bureaucratic level. 
16 Muramatsu Michio and Krauss, Ellis S., 'Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: 
The Case of Japan', in The American Political Science Review, Vol.78, No.1, March 1984, p.128: 
They point out that it is difficult to clarify "whether the postwar democratic reforms have 
resulted in a bureaucracy that accepts the pluralistic rules of the democratic game, as seems to 
have happened in West Germany, or whether the prewar patterns of classical bureaucratic 
norms have remained entrenched, as they seem to have done in Italy". 
17 Johnson, op. cit., p.28 
18 Okimoto, Daniel I., 'Ex-Bureaucrats in the Liberal-Democratic Party', in eds Okimoto, 
Daniel I. and Rohlen, Thomas P., Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary 
Society and Political Economy, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.187-190 
9 
By means of a cultural analysis of power dynamics in Japan, Pye argues 
that the pre-Meiji period feudal system was transformed to a 'modern 
bureaucratic state', where "Government has been more by 
administration than by an open political process" .19 Pye describes this 
system as a ''bureaucratic state with a minimum of tension over 
authority and the character of power"20, where bureaucrats were able to 
change policy with little or no restraint in order to avoid crisis 
situations developing. A similar point is made by Pempel, who ·has 
called the bureaucratic nature of Japanese politics "creative 
conservatism" .21 
Ex-bureaucrats' knowledge and skills, as well as their ties with 
ministries, provided the LDP with politicians who had many 
advantages over other parties. They " ... have given the ruling 
conservative party leadership ability, based on first hand experience in 
public administration, intimate knowledge of the policy-making 
processes, access to the best available information, and extensive 
contacts with elites in both public and private sectors" .22 Thus, the 
LDP' s conservative factions, characterised by their bureaucratic origins, 
were more capable of adapting to the demands of the population than 
were opposition parties, which generally had very limited bureaucratic 
experience within their ranks. 23 During the period of the 
19 Pye, Lucian W., and Pye, Mary W., Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural 
Dimensions of Authority, Harvard University Press, 1985, p.180 
20 Pye, op. cit., p.180-1 
21 Pempel, T.J., Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism, Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia, 1982, p.307: Pempel argues that "many of the policies followed by the 
conservatives have been creatively astute and at least tolerably popular, while many of the 
policy alternatives posed by the opposition parties have been unimaginative at best and on 
occasion almost totally devoid of insight and popular support". 
22 Okimoto, op. cit., p.189-90 
23 Calder, Kent E., 'Kanryo vs Shomin: Contrasting Dynamics of Conservative Leadership 
in Postwar Japan', in ed MacDougall, Terry Edward, Political Leadership in Contemporary 
Japan, Center for Japanese Studies, Michigan, p.15: Calder analyses the length of rule by Prime 
Ministers and concludes that those who were ex-bureaucrats ruled almost three times longer 
than the ones who were not bureaucrats. 
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normalisation negotiations, all the Prime Ministers were ex-
bureaucrats except Hatoyama and Ishibashi, who were Prime Ministers 
for a relatively short period. 
The position which argues for mutually supportive relations between 
bureaucrats and politicians suggests that it was not only politicians 
who benefited from bureaucracy, but bureaucrats were also dependent 
on their close ties with the LDP for maintaining their power. From this 
view, bureaucrats needed to join the LDP because ''bureaucracy 
depends on the political decisions and Diet votes of the politicians" 
under a democratic system.24 
Reischauer suggests a corporatist model with business, bureaucracy and 
the LDP dominating the policy agenda.25 The dynamics in this model 
are characterised by the isolation of policy making from the general 
population, opposition parties, and interest groups other than business 
on one hand, and the domination by tripartite linkages between 
business, bureaucracy and the LDP on the other hand. This view, 
however does not adequately explain the derivation of politician-
bureaucrat conflict or how such conflict was resolved. 
The third view is represented by Haley who argues that "a variety of 
institutional factors particular to Japan limit bureaucratic influence."26 
He argues for the inherent weakness of bureaucracy using the example 
of administrative guidance. This form of informal control by 
bureaucrats was central to bureaucratic power, since the bureaucracy 
was seen to " .. .lack many of the most basic regulatory powers required 
24 
25 
Reischauer, Edwin 0., The Japanese, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1977, p.292 
ibid., p.290 
26 Haley, John 0., 'Governance by Negotiation: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in 
Japan', Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol.13, No.2, Summer 1987, p.344 
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for effective formal enforcement" .27 Contrary to Johnson, who 
perceives the frequent use of administrative guidance as something 
which places bureaucrats "above the law"28, Haley's position suggests 
that bureaucrats cannot make business do things which it does not 
profit from. The compliance of businesses in an informal setting 
requires mutual rewards for both sides. Koh makes a similar point, 
arguing that cooperation with administrative guidance was effective as 
long as both bureaucrats and business profited from the control.29 This 
notion applies to the business-bureaucracy ties in developing economic 
relations between Japan and South Korea, especially after 1960, 
although it does not include politicians' roles in the analysis. 
Craig points out the possibility that "bureaucracy has been permitted to 
maintain its substantial autonomy and powers because of its 
willingness to act for the LDP".30 Yakushiji also sees political power as 
a threat to bureaucratic power.31 He explains the gradual increase in 
political power in terms of the increased salience of local "career 
politicians", who were opposed to central bureaucratic control. This 
argument is partially applicable to the periods between 1945 to 1965 
because political influence was not strong during the 50s, but increased 
after 1960, particularly before and after the United States-Japan Security 
Treaty. However, large scale bureaucratic influence in policymaking 
during the 1950s is not explained by this perspective. 
None of the above views by itself, sufficiently explains the influence of 
bureaucrats and politicians on policy making. Each perspective may 
27 
28 
29 
ibid., p.354 
Johnson, op. cit., p.38 
Koh, op. cit., p.257-9 
30 Craig, Albert M., 'Aspects of Government Bureaucracy', in ed Vogel, Ezra F., Modern 
Japanese Organization and Decision-Making, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, 
p.20 
31 Yakushiji Taizo, Seijika vs kanryo: sapurai saido seijigaku no teisho, Toyo keizai 
shinposha, Tokyo, 1987, pp.28-36 
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explain some part of politician-bureaucrat relations in policy making at 
a particular time or in relation to a particular issue. It could be the case 
that all three perspectives, which respectively argue the dominance of 
bureaucrats or politicians over policymaking, and the corporatist 
model of policymaking by LDP, bureaucrats and business, are valid to a 
certain extent. However, how these dynamics shifted should be 
analysed in order to examine who influenced policymaking at the 
particular time period during the normalisation negotiations. Thus, 
the next section illustrates how bureaucrats and politicians acquired 
and exercised power. 
There are many views on the power of bureaucrats over policy, their 
ability to enforce their views and the centrality of their role in 
policymaking in Japan, especially in the postwar period.32 The sources 
of bureaucratic power can mainly be explained by three factors; the 
historical legacy of bureaucratic power, Occupational policy, and the 
meritocratic civil service examination system. 
Historically, the bureaucracy was established as an elite 'class' (kanshi) 
after the Meiji Restoration, placing it between ordinary citizens and the 
imperial family, including the emperor. In this way, the bureaucracy 
was seen as the translator of the imperial will, enforcing the policies of 
state authorised by the emperor. 33 Bureaucrats extended their power 
by using the authority of the emperor, and by building strong ties with 
32 Fukumoto, op. cit. Masamichi Inoki, 'The Civil Bureaucracy', in eds Ward, Robert E., 
and Rustow, Dankwart A., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1964, pp.283-87. Spaulding, Robert M., Jr., Imperial Japan's Higher Civil 
Service Examinations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971. Watanabe Yasuo, 'Komuin 
no kyaria', (The Career Patterns of Civil Servants), in ed Tsuji Kiyoaki, Gyoseigaku koza, dai 2-
kan: Gyosei no rekishi (a Lectures on Public Administration, vol.2: The History of Public 
Administration), Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1976, pp.111-60. Mori Hiroshi and Yazawa 
Shu.jiro, Kanryosei no shihai, Yu.hikaku, Tokyo, 1981. Johnson, 1982. And also by Johnson, 
Chalmers, 'Japan: Who Governs?: An Essay on Official Bureaucracy', The Journal of Japanese 
Studies, Vol.2, No.l, 1975, pp.21-28. Haley, op. cit. Yakushiji, op. cit., Campbell, op. cit. 
33 Tanaka, op. cit., pp.60-62 
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conglomerates (zaibatsu), which shaped the later (post-war) 
bureaucracy-capital nexus. 34 The imperial authority was superficial 
thus enabling the virtual rule of the country by "a coalition of 
hanbatsu (domain cliques) and court nobles"35. Royama Masamichi 
argues that the feudal system before the Meiji Restoration was replaced 
by the rule of the military and the bureaucracy. 36 Those two groups 
essentially ruled Japan until its defeat in World War II. 
It is difficult easily to portray the immense power of the bureaucracy in 
prewar Japan and it may be too easy to dismiss this idea of a 
continuation of prewar bureaucratic power. To put this argument in 
perspective, Koh' s comments are instructive: 
"Generally speaking, power and prestige go hand in hand; hence 
despite the absence of survey data, one may surmise that 
bureaucrats in prewar Japan, symbols as well as wielders of 
awesome power, enjoyed high prestige .... It is worth noting that 
bureaucrats may have been more feared than respected. Their 
arrogance was legendary, and tales of the abuse of bureaucratic 
power were legion. The well known phrase, kanson minpi 
(officials revered, citizens despised) not only summed up a 
major theme in the political culture of prewar Japan; it also 
epitomised the reality of bureaucratic dominance in Japanese 
society."37 
Bureaucrats in postwar Japan not only dominated the policy making 
process and policy implementation, but also extended their influence 
34 
35 
36 
p.14 
37 
ibid., p.73 
Koh, op. cit., p.14 
Koh, B.C., Japan's Administrative Elite, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, 
Koh, op. cit., pp.15-6 
14 
into the ruling party, the LDP. Craig argues that "Japanese bureaucrats 
... do not look simply to the LDP".38 "They see themselves as operating 
above politics in the national interest".39 The enthusiasms of the 
bureaucracy in pursuing national goals seem to have been derived 
from their 'elitist' consciousness. Some attempts have been made to 
explain this greater role of bureaucrats in controlling policy in Japan by 
stating that it is a continuation from the bureaucratic system of prewar 
Japan. Koh argues that "the explicit linking of bureaucratic authority 
and imperial prerogatives" after the Meiji Restoration still maintain 
the elites status of bureaucrats.40 He concludes that the bureaucrats' 
role in the rapid postwar industrialisation of the nation was crucial, 
and that their mobilisation of the population for national unity and 
success resembles the achievements of the modernised bureaucracy in 
Meiji Japan.41 
Johnson points out that governmental authorities were called "those 
above" (okami).42 Fukumoto argues similar points, saying that the 
name for bureaucrats, "civil servants" was not equal to perceptions of 
bureaucrats themselves, and elitist and authoritarian consciousness 
(shihai ishiki, ken'i ishiki) remained despite the Occupation reforms.43 
A continuation of these attitudes from prewar Japan is specifically 
described by Johnson as the replacement of "way of a warrior" 
(bushido) to "way of the bureaucrats" (kanryodo).44 "In addition to 
their status, the bureaucrats of modern Japan also inherited from the 
samurai something comparable to their code of ethics and their elite 
38 Craig, op. cit., p.19: Craig mentioned that a bureaucrat told him that "from time to 
time, the bureaucracy is successful in opposing the policy directives of LDP organs". 
39 ibid., p.19 
40 Koh, op. cit., p.14 
41 
42 
43 
44 
ibid., p.157 
Johnson 1982, p.41 
Fukumoto, op. cit., p.139 
Johnson 1982, p.39-40 
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consciousness" .45 Thus they devoted themselves to the "national 
interest". 
The Occupation policy of purging politicians and military officers, as 
well as conglomerates (zaibatsu) not only preserved, but strengthened 
bureaucratic power. Bureaucrats were the only group who substantially 
survived the purge by the Occupation.46 Johnson estimated that "only 
forty-two higher officials (bureau chiefs and above) were purged from 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry - the wartime Ministry of 
Munitions and only nine from the Ministry of Finance" .47 
The Occupation relied on the bureaucracy to carry out purges and other 
reforms, as well as for managing the recovery of the Japanese economy. 
It was therefore very dependent ·on the bureaucracy and consequently 
allowed officials substantially to retain their power, if not enhance it, 
in the absence of any strong domestic political constraints.48 The 
Occupation authorities feared that major reforms in the bureaucracy 
would bring inefficiency, which would be a major obstacle to its reform 
program.49 This logic is apparent when we look at the dissolution of 
conglomerates (zaibatsu) and the giving of economic functions to 
bureaucrats; functions which were "shared between the government 
and the zaibatsu" before the defeat of Japan.SO 
Another source of bureaucratic power is the extremely competitive 
selection criteria for bureaucrats. This meritocratic recruiting system 
45 ibid., p.38 
Fukumoto, op. cit., p.124. Maki, John M., 'The Role of Bureaucracy in Japan', Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 20, December 1947, pp.397. Johnson 1975, pp.14-22. Johnson 1982, pp.44-46 
47 Johnson 1982, pp.41-2 
46 
48 Koh, op. cit., p.35: Koh points out that "the Occupation took the form of indirect 
rule ... (therefore) the Japanese government was primarily responsible for implementing all 
policy directives emanating from SCAP". 
49 y k h""" · 28 a us 1p, op. cit., p. 
Johnson 1982, p.45 50 
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legitimises bureaucrats of the national government to conceive 
themselves as elite, therefore make them feel that they are responsible 
for, and capable of, guiding society. The national civil service 
examinations were extremely competitive, thus "those who survive 
the competition tend to be among the best that Japan's educational 
system has to offer to that country's prospective employers".51 Those 
who passed the exam automatically thought of themselves as having 
entered the elite.52 This elitist consciousness takes the form of a 
"sacrifice for the public good" mentality within ministries.53 Ito 
Daiichi adds that many senior bureaucrats use their positions as a 
means of expressing their nationalism, thus strengthening their 
perceptions of themselves as not only working for the national 
interest, but perhaps being the best interpreters of it.54 Since they feel 
that they 'rule' Japan, they engage themselves in tasks which deals 
with national interests, whether it is economic development, or 
foreign policy. 
The major roles of bureaucrats are described by Haley as the making 
and implementation of policies. 55 The making of policies reflects 
bureaucratic influence on the legislative process. 56 The 
implementation of policies is pursued by using formal and informal 
methods. Formally, bureaucrats controlled advisory committees,57 
granting "permission", and allocation of resources by the budgetary 
process.58 Informally, they exercised their power by using 
ibid., p.252 
Johnson 1982, p.39 
ibid., p.39 
51 
52 
53 
54 
p.20 
55 
Ito Daiichi, Gendai nihon kanryosei no bunseki, Toyo University Press, Tokyo, 1980, 
Haley, op. cit., p.344 
56 Pempel, T.J., 'The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan', American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol.18, 1974, p.648. Also Fukumoto Tadao, Kanryo, Kobundo, 
Tokyo, p.142-3 
57 Pempel 1974, p.648 
58 Fukumoto, op. cit., p.142-3 
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"administrative guidance" .59 Craig applies Weber's concept of 
bureaucracy, stating that Japanese bureaucrats are more involved in 
the legislative process, but are politically neutral in their objectives.60 
Politicians' power, when compared to the immense power of 
bureaucrats, was limited when the Occupation Army left Japan having 
established new political arrangements. Moreover, many powerful 
politicians were purged as war criminals. Johnson documents that only 
" ... approximately 40 percent of some 329 prewar and wartime 
politicians recently released from the ban against their holding public 
office were reelected to the Diet"61 in the election of October 1952. They 
secured about 30 percent of the seats in the Diet.62 
They were not only disadvantaged by the Occupation policy, but also 
lacked the historical legacy of power enjoyed by bureaucrats. Yakushiji 
argues that democracy was "grafted" onto Japan by the Occupation's 
political reforms, therefore, it did not function well from the onset.63 
He sees a contradiction in the Occupation policy, which on one hand 
preserved the strong central control by bureaucrats, but on the other 
hand attempted to introduce a pluralistic system by strengthening 
political power at the local level.64 According to Yakushiji, this rise of 
local political power did not have a significant effect on the centralised 
control of bureaucrats until Tanaka Kakuei was elected in the 70s. In 
his view, this central control by bureaucrats was perceived as the basis 
of bureaucratic power of both bureaucrats within ministries and ex-
bureaucrats in the LDP. Those two groups are supposed to function in a 
59 ibid., p.142-3 
60 Craig, op. cit., p.17-8: It is pointed out that majority of bills are drafted by bureaucrats in 
the ministries, which is by Weber's term "political". 
6l Johnson 1982, p.46 
62 ibid., p.46 
63 Yakushiji, op. cit., pp.28-36 
64 ibid., p.29 
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very similar way, and ex-bureaucrats in the LDP are described as 
"managers" rather than "politicians" .65 
If ex-bureaucrats in the LDP and bureaucrats in the ministries were 
functioning in similar ways, as Yakushiji suggested, how can conflict 
between the LDP politicians and bureaucrats be explained? It is possible 
that these conflicts indicate that the ties between bureaucrats and 
politicians who were ex-bureaucrats were not as strong as some 
suggest. It could be suggested that bureaucratic dominance in policy 
making was gradually superseded by the rising power of politicians, 
including ex-bureaucrats. Also, a shift of focus from security issues to 
economic issues in the treaty negotiations might have reduced the 
control of bureaucrats and increased political influence.66 Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that the influence of bureaucrats and 
politicians in policymaking, and their power dynamics depended on 
the time and the issues. Inoguchi stated in 1988 that bureaucratic 
dominance of policymaking was no longer applicable. 67 Haley 
observed that the " ... power of the bureaucracy has declined steadily 
during the postwar period" .68 The position of ex-bureaucrats as 
politicians would inevitably have altered their priorities, which then 
would probably, at least to some degree, have conflicted with the 
65 ibid., p.28-36: He argues that ex-bureaucrats had information gathering functions 
which enabled rule from the centre by LDP and bureaucrats. This central rule is considered 
non-political, therefore it created a "political vacuum", while political power was concentrated 
at the local electoral level. 
66 Reischauer, op. cit., p.290-2: He argues that "During the period when decisions on 
industrial growth policies were the major ones being made by the Japanese government, the 
particularly powerful pressure group of big business did indeed have a specially significant role 
in the political process." Thus implies that economic priority in policy orientation gives power 
to politicians. He also points out that only the Foreign Ministry lacked Advisory Boards in 
1972, thus popular participation was not reflected in foreign policy as much as in other fields of 
policies. 
67 Inoguchi Tadashi, 'Bureaucrats and Politicians: shifting Influence', in eds. Okimoto, 
Daniel I., and Rohlen, Thomas P., Inside the Japanese Systems: Reading on Contemporary 
Society and Political Economy, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1988, pp.185-6: He suggests 
that bureaucracy dominated decision making process during 1940 to 1960s. 
68 Haley, op. cit., p.344. Also Krauss, Ellis S., 'Political Economy: Policymaking and 
Industrial Policy in Japan', Political Science and Politics, March 1992, p.47: Krauss supports this 
point saying that bureaucratic power was "probably at its height in the first twenty years after 
WWII" . 
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interests of bureaucrats in ministries. In addition, factional struggles 
within the LDP, especially the conflicts between the mainstream 
conservative faction represented by ex-bureaucrats, and the anti-
mainstream factions (tojinha) might also have reduced bureaucratic 
power.69 
The reason why bureaucrat-politician relations shifted from a 
supportive relationship to a more conflictive one, or the shift from 
bureaucratic dominance in policy making to the increased influence of 
politicians on the negotiations, also depended on the issue?O The shift 
in focus from security issues to economic issues during the negotiation 
period implies that domination by the bureaucracy in policymaking 
was replaced by the rise of political power. Political interest in the 
normalisation issue increased because of the detention of fishermen, 
the United States-Japan Security Alliance issue, and by the developing 
economic ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea. These issues 
perhaps "politicised" the decision making process, and accordingly, 
over the course of the negotiation, reduced bureaucratic influence and 
increased political intervention in the negotiations. 
69 Johnson, op. cit., pp.46-7: Johnson points out that those two factions compete against 
each other. 
70 Campbell, Creighton John, 'Bureaucratic Primacy: Japanese Policy Communities in an 
American Perspective', Governance, Vol.2, No.1, January 1989, p.12. See also Craig, op. cit., 
p.20: Craig argues that politicians gain control over the issues which are politically sensitive. 
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1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EAST ASIAN POLICIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES,JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1951-1965 
During the period between 1951 and 1965, when the normalisation 
treaty was under negotiation, American East Asian policy underwent a 
major shift around 1960. This shift greatly influenced both Japan's and 
South Korea's East Asian policies. Pae Sung Moun describes the 
dynamics of United States, Japanese and Korean policies as a "Bipolar-
Hierarchical System" in the 1950s, and as a "Loose Bipolar-Mixed 
Hierarchical System"71 in the 1960s, reflecting the changes in the 
multilateral relationship over this period. Two poles in his models 
locates Japan and Korea on one side, and United States on the other 
side. He argues that the 1960s showed the decline of United States 
power, which encouraged Japan and the Republic of Korea to exercise 
more independent policy stances than was possible under the stricter 
more hegemonic United States policies of the 1950s.72 
1.1. The East Asian Policies of the United States, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea During the Korean War 
The establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 
1949, as well as the success of the atomic bomb experiments by the 
USSR in August of the same year determined the direction of United 
States East Asian policy for the following decade. The core of this policy 
thereafter became "the containment project, providing security against 
both the enemy and the ally; and the hegemonic project, providing for 
American leverage over the necessary resources of our industrial 
rivals".73 It meant the containment of the PRC and the USSR and 
71 Pae Sung Moun, 'The Two Koreans and the Northeast Asian International Subsystem' 
in Korea and World Affairs, vol.5, no.2, Summer 1981, pp. 203-217 
72 ibid., pp. 204-217 
73 Cumings, Bruce, op. cit., p. 88 
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American hegemonic projection towards Japan and other Asian 
countries. Pointing out the fact that the United States sent troops to 
Taiwan on June 27 and to Saigon on August 10 after the Korean War 
broke out in 1950, Hatada argues that the United States' policy towards 
Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam was integrated after this period.74 
Hegemonic projection was pursued by the United States in order to 
stop the expansion of communism through United States' exploitation 
of politic al and economic crises. 
The United States considered it necessary to stabilise the world 
economy by integrating Europe and Asia around the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Japan respectively.75 With the emergence of the PRC, 
Japan acquired strategic importance for the United States, which 
subsequently reversed its initial policy of not assisting Japan's post-war 
economic recovery.76 Lee Jongwon argues that the United States 
established a system for Japan to profit from American military supply 
demands in East Asia before the start of the Korean War.77 The 
outbreak of the Korean War and following conflicts in Asia 
contributed greatly to the economic recovery of Japan by earning 
"foreign exchange through the special procurement of goods and 
services required by the United States armed forces" .78 
After joining the Korean War, the United States concluded the Japan-
United States Security Treaty in 1951, following the conclusion of the 
Hatada Shigeo, op. cit ., p. 11 74 
75 Lee Jongwon, 'Sengo Beikoku no kyokuto seisaku to kankoku no datsu shokuminchi 
ka', in Iwanami koza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to shokuminchika, eds. Oe 
Shinobu et al., lwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, pp. 6-7 
76 Okita Saburo, The Developing Economies and Japan: Lessons in Growth, University 
of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 138-139 
77 Lee Jongwon, op. cit., pp. 14-15 
78 Okita Saburo, op. cit., p. 140. Even after the Korean War, "Japan continued to gain 
procurement earnings in subsequent years from the United States armed forces stationed in 
Japan and her neighbouring areas which maintained an annual average of nearly 500 million 
dollars." 
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San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which the USSR and the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) were not involved. This Security Treaty 
allowed United States troops to remain in Japan after the Occupation, 
thereby "committing the United States to Japan's defence".79 During 
the Korean War, this treaty enabled the United States to use Japan as a 
military base. It seems apparent that Japan's defence and economic 
recovery were the most crucial goals for the United States in building a 
defence against the expansion of communism in East Asia.so The 
United States pursued this goal by providing Japan with the 
mechanism to profit from both United States and Republic of Korea 
military requirements, as well as providing a 'free-ride' on United 
States funded defence of Japan, through its many Japanese military 
bases. For the United States, the push to persuade Japan to rearmament 
gave way to the drive for the economic recovery of Japan at this stage. 
Japanese East Asian policy after 1951 was greatly influenced by the 
Occupation policy in Japan. Until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came 
into effect on April 28, 1952, Japan was virtually under the control of 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.Bl 
Subsequently, the Japan-United States Security Treaty became the basis 
of Japanese East Asian policy. Japan played a major, but indirect role, in 
the Korean War, supporting the Republic of Korea and the United 
States, principally as a supply base. 
Additionally, the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself determined Japan's 
relations with other Asian nations to a certain degree. Article 4 (a) of 
Reischauer, Edwin 0., The Japanese, Tuttle & Company, Tokyo, 1978, p. 341 79 
80 Cumings, Bruce, op. cit., p. 98. Cumings argues that Korea's significance for the United 
States was primarily for the security for Japan. 
81 Ono Katsumi, Kasumigaseki gaiko - sono dento to hitobito, Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 
Tokyo, 1978, pp. 208-209. Ono was a Foreign Ministry official (sanjikan) in the first round 
normalisation talks. According to Ono, SCAP-GHQ ordered the Japanese Foreign Ministry to 
prohibit direct contact with any foreign country before the conclusion of the San Fransisco 
Peace Treaty. 
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the treaty stated that the settlement of property claims, either by Japan 
or to Japan, is to be arranged between Japan and authorities of 
countries which Japan negotiates with. It stated that property claims 
"shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such 
authorities."82 Negotiations on normalising relations of Japan with 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea both started in 1951. Although 
Prime Minister Yoshida disagreed with the American policy of 
recognising the Taiwan regime, American pressure prevailed and 
Japan-Taiwanese relations were normalised the next year. Considering 
that a trade agreement was concluded between Japan and the Republic 
of Korea in 1949, the lack of diplomatic relations between the two 
nations did not interfere significantly in basic Japanese-South Korean 
trade. 
Since the start of the negotiations with Asian countries, Japan's prime 
interest was to take time over the negotiations and to soften the claims 
against Japan as much as it could.83 Tanaka argues that Japan profited 
from the Cold War conflict because the normalisation treaty with 
Taiwan was concluded by the abandonment of the property claim 
against Japan by the Chiang Kai-shek government, in response to both 
direct American pressure and a strong desire to cement anti-
communist alliances.84 
Japanese trade policy during the Korean War was basically in line with 
United States East Asian policy since Japan could profit economically 
82 Appendix 'Treaty of Peace with Japan' in Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., 
p.313 
83 Tanaka Hiroshi, 'Nihon no sengo sekinin to asia - sengo hosho to rekishi ninshiki', in 
Iwanami koza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to shokuminchika, eds. Oe 
Shinobu et al., lwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, p. 200 
84 ibid., 1993, p. 200 
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by following this policy line.BS However, the first unofficial trade 
agreement between the Peoples Republic of China and Japan after the 
end of World War Il was signed in May 1952. This implies that the 
primary goal for Japan was the reconstruction of its economy at least 
partially through the re-establishment of those profitable trading 
relationships with neighbouring states that had preceded the Second 
World War.86 
East Asian Policy of the Republic of Korea was greatly influenced by the 
Korean War. The War made the Republic of Korea more strategically 
important for the United States,87 thus increased the support to the 
Republic Korea militarily and financially. Syngman Rhee, whose 
regime was suffering a legitimacy crisis, was saved by the outbreak of 
the war. The Rhee regime secured United States military aid (through 
the agency of the United Nations), therefore securing the continuation 
of the regime itself. The Republic of Korea's East Asian policy during 
the Korean War was fundamentally a policy of survival. After the 
PRC's involvement began in the Korean War, the Republic of Korea 
adopted an anti-PRC stance as well. When it came to relations with 
Japan, there was a continuation of the strong anti-Japanese feeling 
which derived from the Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Although 
Syn gm an Rhee was opposed to the idea of an alliance with Japan, he 
85 Ono Katsumi, op. cit., pp. 210-211. Ono observed that Prime Minister Yoshida was not 
'necessarily a puppet of America, but knew that Japan would benefit mostly by following the 
United States policy'. 
86 ibid., p. 212. He concludes that despite the basic alliance of Japan with the United 
States, Japanese economic interests were pursued through diplomacy, principally that 
concerned with trade and business and did not rely on any strategic policy pressure derived 
from the alliance. 
87 Kil Soong-Hoom, 'Japan in American-Korean Relations', in Korea and the United 
States: A Century of Cooperation, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii 
Press, Honolulu, 1984, p. 155. According to Kil, "Of the sixteen nations receiving American 
economic aid in April 1946, Korea was listed fifteenth in strategic importance."; Also see Han 
Sung-Joo, 'Policy Towards the United States', in The Foreign Policy of the Re-public of Korea, 
eds. Koo Youngnok and Han Sung-joo, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, p. 144. He 
said,"South Korea was compelled to play only a small role fitting the overall United States 
foreign policy. However, the situation changed drastically with the outbreak of the Korean 
War." 
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accepted a trade agreement with Japan and the Japan-United States 
Security Treaty.88 The pragmatic stance of the South Korean regime at 
this time was to conform as much as necessary to American and 
Japanese policy initiatives so as to retain allies with which to fight the 
DPRK. 
1.2. The East Asian Policy of the United States, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea from 1953-1960 
The United States East Asian policy during this period was 
characterised by the maintenance of the containment of communist 
expansion and hegemonic economic projection towards Japan and 
other Asian countries, particularly Taiwan and South Korea. The 
United States' commitment to the defence of the Republic of Korea 
after the Korean War was reflected in its military and economic 
support.89 After the truce was signed between the Republic of Korea 
and the DPRK, a security treaty with the United States was concluded 
in 1953. This was followed by the Taiwan-United States Security Treaty 
in the following year. 
Japan's economic and military cooperation with other free-world 
Asian countries was also promoted by the United States. Yoshikazu 
Sakamoto argues that "America regarded Japanese cooperation with 
88 Hahn Bae-Ho, 'Major Issues in the American-Korean Alliance', in Korea and the 
United States: A Century of Cooperation, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of 
Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, p .98. "Rhee complained about using Japanese technicians and 
engineers brought to Korea during the Korean War for repair work by the American military 
commanders in Korea." Rhee even went further to say that "Korean people are worried more 
about Japan than the Soviet Union". p. 98 
89 Okonogi Masao, 'Chosen hanto o meguru kokusai seiji', in Chosen hanto no seiji keizai 
kozo, ed. Mitani Shizuo, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyusho, Tokyo, 1983, p.133. According to 
Okonogi, the United States spent $US180 million on the Korean War. He also estimates that 
$US2 million for economic aid and more than $US3 million for military aid was paid annually 
between 1950 to 1960; see also Hahn Bae-Ho, op. cit., p. 96. " ... during the seven-year period 
between 1954 and 1960 the United States provided South Korea with a total of $US2.6 billion in 
economic grants-in-aid, which is equivalent to some 8.6 percent of the total South Korean 
gross national product for the period. Moreover, the United States provided a total of $US1.2 
billion in military aid (grants) during the same period." 
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South Korea as the key to reinforcing her moral and military position 
in East Asia because, among other things, it was absolutely vital to the 
effective pursuit of the United States' military policy against China" .90 
Although the encouragement of ties among Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan was an important part of its East Asian policy, the 
central interest of the United States after the Korean War was still to 
reconstruct the Japanese economy and to bring about the 
remilitarisation of Japan within the American global strategic 
framework. The American support for the Japanese economic recovery 
also continued and, in comparison to Korea or Taiwan, as a priority. At 
the meeting prior to the signing of the United States-Republic of Korea 
Security Treaty, US Secretary of State "Dulles was suggesting that Rhee 
should go along with the American plan to use part of the funds 
designated for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy for 
developing the war-devastated Japanese economy".91 This suggestion 
obviously did not please the Koreans who saw this as another example 
of Japanese resurgence at their expense and, in all probability, 
reinforced the hostility of the Rhee regime to normalising relations 
with Japan. Rhee expressed the fear that "if Japan is built up with the 
money to be used for Korea as the producer, and if the other countries 
in Asia, including Korea, remains as buyers, the others will become 
'slaves' to Japan".92 
90 Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Japanese-South Korea Cooperation: Its Implications in the 
Context of the Sino-American Confrontation', in Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, 
vol. IV, no.2, August 1966, p. 54. He also says that "America regarded Japanese cooperation 
with South Korea as the key to reinforcing her moral and military position in East Asia 
because, among other things, it was absolutely vital to effective pursuit of United States 
military policy against China." 
91 Hahn Bae-Ho, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
92 ibid., p. 98. Rhee knew the importance of Japan to the United States but thought it 
derived from Japanese skill to draw out American sympathy towards Japan pointing out that 
"the Japanese are extremely clever in handling Western psychology". 
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At the same time, the United States attempted to further remilitarise 
Japan. Richard Nixon, then U.S. Vice-President, made a statement in 
1953 that it was a mistake for the United States to have forced upon 
Japan the non-aggression article of the Japanese constitution.93 The 
revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty was started in 1955 
with the aim of moving Japan towards accepting more responsibility 
for her own defence. The claim is advanced in some Japanese circles 
that at the same time, the establishment of the North East Asian Treaty 
Organisation, a counterpart of the South East Asian Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO), was attempted.94 This proposed alliance would 
have tied Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and the United States 
into a mutual security treaty. However, the dynamics of the 
relationships between the proposed allies, particularly between Japan 
and her former colonies, was such that the proposal did not succeed, if, 
indeed, it was ever made in this form.95 A key factor in this failure was 
the continuing suspicion of a resurgence of Japanese military power by 
the other Asian nations and, in terms of the Korea-Japan relationship, 
continuing animosity from the Koreans and a continuation of 
Japanese colonial attitudes towards Korea.96 
Japanese East Asian policy from after the Korean War to 1960 was 
focused on the acquisition of status in the international community 
and the pursuit of economic advantage within the framework of the 
Hatada Shigeo, op. cit., p. 11 93 
94 Hatada Takashi et al., op. cit., p. 71; A North Korean article suggests that the Fourth 
Round Talks were held to facilitate the United States creating the North East Asian Treaty 
Organisation, following in the path of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation, which was 
concluded on September 8th, 1954. This article also argues that the United States attempted to 
make Japan support South Korea economically in place of the United States from around this 
period; see Chosen daigakko, Kan-nichi kaidan no honshitsu ni tsuite - sono keika to haikei ni 
kansuru kcsatsu, Chosen daigakko, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 6-47; Chang Young-Gil also points out that 
an American reduction of responsibilities in East Asia required closer ties between Japan and 
the Republic of Korea. See Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 84. 
95 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 235-6 
96 Hahn Bae-Ho, op. cit., p. 98. Rhee expressed South Korean's fear that "Japan is aiming 
at its old colonial ideas." 
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Japan-United States Security Alliance. Japan's desire to acquire status in 
the international community was mainly realised by joining the 
United Nations and other international organisations into which the 
United States sponsored it. Following the partial normalisation of 
relations with the USSR in 1956, Japan became a member of United 
Nations, and then became a U.N. Security Council non-permanent 
member in 1957. Security policy during this period shows that Japan 
considered it necessary to rearm, but decided to keep a small-scale 
defence force so that it could devote the majority of its budget to 
economic development.97 Here, we can see a conflict of interest 
between the United States' policy objectives and Japanese interests. 
Japan finally compromised to develop a small-scale defence force, 
initially created under the Occupation, into the Self Defence Forces in 
1954, and agreed to revise the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 
August 1955 to reflect this. Despite American pressure to amend the 
security treaty since then, Japan has had no intention of giving up its 
'free-ride' on the United States for its defence as guaranteed by the 1951 
security treaty. The United States tried but gave up an attempt to 
further amend the security treaty in the spring of 1957.98 
Another tactic taken by Japanese governments for developing the 
economy was the tough bargaining stance taken in respect of the 
reparations and property claims against Japan by nations which were 
the victims of Japanese war time aggression. The Japanese Finance 
97 Okita Saburo, 1980, p. 115. He estimates that if military expenditure at prewar levels 
had continued, the economy would have grown at 2 percent less annually than was actually 
achieved by adoption of this policy; also see Gordon, Bernard K., 'Japan: Searching Once Again', 
in Asia Pacific in the New World Politics, ed. Hsiung, James C., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder, 1993, p. 55. Gordon points out three aims of Japanese economic development, 
"foreign markets for Japan's products; minimal spending for defence ... ; and, finally, a big 
brother." 
98 Kil, Soong-Hoom, 1984, p. 158. He also argues that if the Japan-United States Security 
Treaty had been amended then, there was a possibility that the United States might have 
withdrawn its troops from the Republic of Korea and the Japan-South Korea Security Treaty 
might have replaced American troops in Korea with Japanese troops as the guarantor of South 
Korean sovereignty. 
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Ministry has said that Japan succeeded in reducing the payments made 
for reparation and property claims to other Asian countries by taking a 
long time for bargaining and settlement of these claims.99 Property 
claim settlements only began in 1954, beginning with the settlement 
with Burma in 1954, followed by Thailand in 1955, the Philippines in 
1956, Indonesia and Laos in 1958 and Cambodia and South Viet_nam in 
1959. The settlement of property claims also brought economic 
advantages to Japan through the claims, in part, being tied to payment 
in goods and services sourced from Japan as aid rather than through 
cash or cash convertible payments such as gold. Furthermore, Japan 
could use those reparation payments or the economic aid for 
development of economic ties between those countries as an industry 
stimulant, once it could afford it.100 In this context, it is important to 
note that the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation negotiations 
continued during this period and that, of all the nations (other than 
Taiwan) making claims against Japan, Korea had the longest history of 
Japanese control and exploitation. It could therefore be expected to 
make the largest claims. 
Japanese interest in developing its economy drove Japan in foreign 
policy directions which took it outside the tight boundaries tacitly 
imposed through the Japan-United States Security Alliance sphere. 
Prime Minister Hatoyama proclaimed an "autonomous people' s 
diplomacy"101 in December 1954, and attempted the development of 
economic ties with communist countries. Japanese trade with the PRC 
during the Hatoyama government dramatically increased by 50% from 
1954 to 1955.102 Negotiations for normalisation of relations between 
Japan and the USSR began in 1955, and were concluded the following 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Tanaka Hiroshi, op. cit., p. 200 
ibid'/ p. 200 
Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 76 
ibid ., p. 77 
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year. Japanese contact with the DPRK started in 1955, following the 
establishment of the Japan-DPRK Association and the Japan-DPRK 
Trading Association.103 When the Republic of Korea banned trade with 
Japan in August, as a response to Japan's pro-DPRK stance, the 
Japanese government announced a ban on trade with the DPRK.104 
This reaction to criticism from one of its neighbours allied with it to 
the United States, provides some indication of the limits of Japanese 
foreign policy within the American security policy framework. Japan 
also supported the United States in its tactic of only admitting the 
Republic of Korea, and excluding the DPRK, at the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1956.105 The Japanese logic here was probably to 
show Japan's commitment to the Japan-United States Security Alliance 
framework, since Japan profited more from this than trade with the 
DPRK. 
The birth of the Kishi government, with the assumption of power by 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1957, brought a major change in 
Japanese foreign policy. The idea of the Republic of Korea as the front-
line of Japanese security against communism re-emerged during this 
period,106 and was known as the Pusan akahata ran (Red Flags at 
Pusan Theory).107 Also, the "autonomous people's policy" pushed by 
Hatoyama was overtaken by the pro-United States stance of the 
conservative faction of the LDP.108 As a consequence of this change in 
Japanese politics, the revision of the Japan-United States Security 
103 Ko Jun-Sok, Sengo cho-nichi kankeishi - kaiho chosen to nihon, Shakai hyoron sha, 
Tokyo, 1987, p. 148 
104 ibid., p. 68 
loc. cit. 105 
106 Kil Soong-Hoom, op. cit., p. 154. The idea that the Korean peninsula was the security 
front for Japan existed in the Meiji era, when the Korean peninsula was referred to as "a dagger 
pointed at the heart of Japan". 
107 Uchida Kenzo et al., 'Nikkan hijyun o meguru seiji Jyokyo', in Gendai no me, October 
1965, p. 70 
108 ibid., p. 69 
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Treaty was restarted by Prime Minister Kishi, and was concluded in 
1960. 
In South Korea, President Rhee's anti-DPRK, pro-United States stance 
was maintained throughout the period between 1954-1960. However, 
Rhee's position towards Japan shows continuing ambiguity, although 
his basic distrust of Japan continued. After the conclusion of the 
Republic of Korea-United States Security Treaty, the United States 
proposed that the Republic of Korea cooperate in the establishment of a 
Pacific security alliance which would include Japan.109 This alliance is 
frequently referred to in Japanese opposition and left-wing circles as 
the North East Asian Treaty Organisation, although Reischauer 
comments that this term was unknown by American leaders.110 Rhee, 
however, refused to cooperate, fearing that the Japanese would 
dominate Asia again. As an option to the proposed alliance, Rhee 
proposed a North East Asia Alliance with countries such as the 
Philippines, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, but 
excluding Japan.111 It was aimed at preventing both the invasion of 
communism and economic neo-colonialism by Japan in the region. 
This proposal, which had some merit, failed mainly because the 
Republic of Korea's status in the international community was very 
low.112 
1.3. East Asian Policy of the United States, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea from 1960-1965 
109 Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 235-236 
110 Reischauer, op. cit., p. 349. Reischauer comments: "The term (NEATO), though often 
referred to by Japanese leftists, was actually unknown to the American leaders of the time." He 
further comments that it would have been improbable to replicate SEATO as it had been an 
obvious failure and had, by the rnid-1960's become inactive. The term NEATO, if it existed at 
all, is obviously not significant outside Japan as it fails to be mentioned in either generalist 
texts (eg. Mackerras, C. ed. Eastern Asia: An Introductory History) or specialist texts (eg. Lone, 
S. and McCormack, G. Korea Since 1850, St Martin's Press, New York, 1993) 
111 Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 236 
112 loc. cit. 
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1960 saw major change in the United States' East Asian policy. The 
rigid bipolar nature of the United States-Soviet conflict in the 1950's 
was replaced by the rising influence of smaller powers within each 
bloc. In the Soviet bloc, the Sino-Soviet dispute113 and the Cuban Crisis 
in 1962 altered the ''bipolar and intractable nature"114 of power 
dynamics. The United States, suffering from an economic crisis 
partially bought on by maintaining enormous military expenditures115 
altered its hegemonic projects around this period. The Mutual Security 
Agreement Act in 1951, to give direct military and economic aid to 
both Japan and South Korea through the provision of goods, was 
replaced with the Development Loan Fund in 1957, which assisted 
Japanese and South Korean economic development through the 
provision of loans, legalised by the Overseas Assistance Act in 1961.116 
Despite its financial difficulties, the American need for hegemonic and 
economic policies to succeed increased because of the situation in 
Vietnam and the Republic of Korea. In Vietnam, the pro-United States 
President Diem was assassinated, and in the Republic of Korea 
instability continued following the overthrow of Syngman Rhee in 
1960. At the beginning of the 1960s, the United States not only 
attempted to attack communism in Vietnam, but also considered it 
necessary to secure the non-communist regime in the Republic of 
Korea as a necessary part of its containment policy.117 
113 Okonogi Masao, op. cit., p. 135. He argues that the Sino-Soviet dispute was triggered 
by the first Sino-Indian dispute in 1959 and the termination of soviet economic and technical 
assistance to the PRC in 1960. 
114 c · · 87 ummgs, op. cit., p. 
115 Ishikawa Shigeru. et al., op. cit., pp. 21-22 
116 Kasai Nobusachi, 'Nikkan keizai kankei no hensen - izon to jiritsu no sokoku', in 
Posuto reisen no Chosen Hanto, ed. Okonogi Masao, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyusho, 
Tokyo, 1994,p.328 
117 Hatada Shigeo, op. cit., p. 14 
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What was essential to this policy was to integrate Japan, Taiwan, the 
Republic of Korea and Vietnam as a crescent of anti-communist 
regimes confronting communist Chinese expansionism. In this 
context, the American encouragement for Japan to strengthen ties with 
other American aligned Asian nations from the beginning of the 1960s 
could be closely linked to the situation in Vietnam. 
The United States, facing financial problems, could pursue further 
military involvement in Asia if shared some of the United States's 
burdens by strengthening ties with other U.S. aligned nations in Asia. 
In this respect, normalisation between Japan and the Republic of Korea 
was strongly advocated by the United States from around 1960. The 
Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 4, 1964 further involved the United 
States in Vietnam, thus making it even more urgent from the 
American perspective, that all its allied states in Northeast Asia have 
fully normalised relations. This would subsequently promote 
American led economic hegemony in the region and, hopefully, 
further relieve the United States of some of the financial burden of 
regional defence. 
Japanese East Asian policy during this period shows the continuation 
of its economic development-centred policy begun during the 1950s. 
The anti-communist pro-United States stance was also continued from 
the beginning of the Kishi government from 1957, although this did 
not extend to curtailing trade with the communist bloc. The 
conclusion of the Japan-United States Security Alliance in 1960 by 
Prime Minister Kishi enabled Prime Ministers Ikeda and Sato to 
expand Japan's role beyond the rigid Japan-United States bipolar 
structure. Since Japan overwhelmingly profited from the United 
States' trade with Japan during the 1950s, the economic crisis in the 
34 
I:· 
111 
United States also forced Japan to find alternative trading partners. In 
order to achieve this economic goal, Prime Minister Ikeda proclaimed 
Japan's new foreign policy, "separation of politics and economy", 
which attempted to separate Japan's political stance and its economic 
relations with free-world and communist nations.118 
The South Korean East Asian policy after 1960 showed a dramatic shift 
from that of the Rhee regime. The anti-Japanese stance of Rhee was 
replaced by the pro-Japanese policy of Chang Myon and Park Chung 
Hee. The Chang Myon government proposed the establishment of an 
East Asian Alliance, with members including the Republic of Korea, 
Japan, the United States, Taiwan and the Philippines, dramatically 
altering the proposal previously advanced by the Rhee administration. 
Under Park Chung Hee, Japan and the Republic of Korea reached an 
agreement on military cooperation in October 1962, followed by a 
United States-Republic of Korea announcement supportive of an early 
rapprochement between Japan and South Korea on August 17 and 
October 1, 1964. In the same year119 President Park Chung Hee 
promised to send South Korean troops to Vietnam in February 1965, at 
the request of President Johnson of the United States. Han Sung-Joo 
argues that the Republic of Korea's involvement in the Vietnam War 
suggests that South Korea's security was not really guaranteed by Japan 
(as its mutual defence treaty would suggest) and the Republic of Korea 
attempted to stop the "weakening of the United States security 
118 Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 124. Ikeda announced "cooperation with the free nations 
in economic and political matters, a United Nations-centred diplomacy, and an Afro-Asian 
orientation." Also see, Pae Sung Moun op. cit., pp. 210- 216. "Japan's trade with China 
continued to rise during the 1960s"; and Japan also "increased trade with the Soviet Union". 
119 Okonogi Masao, op. cit., p . 137; also see Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Japanese-South Korean 
Cooperation: Its Implications in the Context of the Sino-American Confrontation,' Journal of 
Social and Political Ideas in Japan, Vol. IV, No. 2, August 1966, p.54. Sakamoto argues that, the 
United States "during the last two weeks of September 1964 ... openly attempted to facilitate 
normalization talks at that particular time, not simply because the Park regime faced a serious 
financial crisis, but more significantly because enormous Sino-American tensions had arisen 
following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and because Washington anticipated that 
China would conduct a nuclear test in the autumn." 
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commitment in Korea"120 by providing troops to the United States to 
support its efforts in Vietnam. 
The argument that United States East Asian policy was the most 
influential factor in the normalisation negotiations between Japan and 
the Republic of Korea seems to stand on several different bases. For 
example: (1) The pre-First Round Talks, and the first and second 
rounds of negotiation were initiated and supported by the United 
States during the Korean War; (2) There was no significant benefit or 
need for the United States to normalise relations between Japan and 
the Republic of Korea after the Korean War to the beginning of the 
1960s, therefore there was no significant support for the normalisation 
by the United States during this period; (3) The changing 
international environment in the mid 1960s and the urgency for the 
United States to normalise relations between Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, to support its security concerns, resulted in strong United States 
pressure on both Japan and the Republic of Korea, shortly followed by 
the conclusion of the treaty. 
On the other hand, the Korean perspective seem to emphasise the 
point that the regime change in the Republic of Korea eliminated 
Rhee's anti-Japanese stance, which therefore resulted in the eventual 
conclusion of the treaty. However, an overview of the East Asian 
policies of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea seems to 
suggest that Japanese East Asian policy was based on different 
objectives from that of the United States and the Republic of Korea. In 
the next three chapters the influences of United States East Asian 
policy and the Republic of Korea's pro-Japanese stance on the Japanese 
120 Han Sung-Joo, 'Policy Towards the United States', 1985, p. 150 
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negotiating position at the normalisation talks are re-evaluated. Also, 
the impact of Japanese domestic perspectives will be examined. 
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2: NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR 
During the Korean War, the United States continued to pressure both 
Japan and the Republic of Korea to negotiate the normalisation issue. 
South Korea was also eager to settle the issue to its advantage, despite 
Rhee's anti-Japanese feelings.121 The negotiating position taken by the 
Japanese, however, was to avoid the resolution of the normalisation 
issue at this point; a tactic it pursued throughout the preliminary talks 
and the First and Second Round Talks. 
2.1. Preparatory Talks 
Preparatory talks prior to the First Round Talks for the normalisation 
treaty were held because of an order given by SCAP to the Japanese.122 
The Korean negotiator Kim Dong-Jo wrote in his memoir that the 
Republic of Korea side had been asking for SCAP intervention in order 
to solve the problem of the legal status of Koreans in Japan. SCAP 
responded by ordering the Japanese to attend the preparatory round of 
talks.123 The negotiation session was arranged through SCAP in Japan, 
since Japan was still under Occupation control. 
Here we can see that the Korean interest was slightly different from 
that of the United States. For South Korea, the request for the United 
States to support the opening of negotiations with Japan was a 
continuation of attempts to obtain an advantage over Japan as 
relations became more normalised following the conclusion of the San 
121 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 243-244 
122 ibid., p.18. He is one of the few negotiator who dealt with the normalisation issue 
throughout its 14 years; see also Gendaishi kenkyu.sho hen, Nikkan joyaku no mikata, 
Gendaishi kenkyusho, Tokyo, 1965, p. 1; also, Lee Jongwon, op. cit., p. 28; Chang says that the 
talk was mediated by "General Matthew B. Ridgeway, the Supreme Commander for Allied 
Powers in Japan, and his diplomatic adviser, Mr. William Sebald". See Chang Young-Gil, op. 
cit., p. 63 
123 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 18-19 
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Francisco Treaty.124 Their concern was to solve a number of problems, 
such as; (1) to stop Japanese fishing boats from trespassing into the 
Korean maritime zone denoted by the McArthur Line; (2) to acquire 
Japanese vessels left in the Republic of Korea following Japan's defeat; 
and, (3) to reach an agreement over the status of Koreans resident in 
Japan so that they could acquire a different status from other foreigners 
resident in J apan.125 This latter issue was an especially urgent rri.atter 
for the South Korean government. Although the same social services 
as provided to Japanese citizens were guaranteed to Koreans resident 
in Japan by the Japanese government for four years after the San 
Francisco Treaty came into effect, those Koreans would lose Japanese 
citizenship at the same time.126 
On the other hand, the United States saw Japan-South Korean 
normalisation as necessary for strengthening ties among non-
communist capitalist nations allied to it in Asia prior to the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty coming into effect.127 Hatada et al argue that the 
establishment of close ties between Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan was aimed at countering the communist PRC regime, which 
had become a major concern for the United States.128 Considering that 
the Japan-Taiwan normalisation negotiation was started at the same 
time129 despite considerable domestic and political opposition to it in 
Japan, it is a convincing argument. In fact, the policy for post-
Occupation Japan prepared by the United States National Security 
124 ibid., pp. 4-19. The Republic of Korea succeeded in convincing the United States to 
alter Article 4(b) of the San francisco Peace Treaty, which acknowledges South Korea as having 
received Japanese treasures left in Korea from SCAP-GHQ. It also attempted to enforce the 
'Peace Line' before the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, but was not successful. 
125 
'b'd 5 1 1 ., p. 
126 Miyazaki Shigeki, 'Zainichi kankokujin no hoteki chi-i', in Jurisuto, vol. 327, August 
1965, p. 25 
127 Gendaishi kenkyusho hen, op. cit., p. 1; also see Ishikawa Shigeru et al., op. cit., p. 20 
Hatada Takashi et al, op. cit., p. 63. Hatada goes further and argues that the 
rearmament of Japan and the establishment of the Japan-South Korea security alliance was 
128 
attempted before the start of the Korean War. 
129 Imazu Hiroshi, "'15 Nen kosho" saishu dankai e', in Asahi Janaru, 10 October 1965, p. 15 
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Council in May 1951 states that one of Japan's projected roles would be 
the "development of appropriate military forces" and "participation in 
a regional security arrangement" .130 The basis of such an arrangement 
would obviously be fully normalised relations, including trade and 
military relations, between those United States aligned nations in the 
. 
region. 
The Japanese, although conforming to the United States request to 
open normalisation talks with the Republic of Korea, were rather 
passive during the negotiations, unwilling to settle any issue at the 
preliminary talks.131 The only issue the Japanese showed interest in 
was the legal status of Koreans in Japan.132 The Korean side "felt that 
Japan would be in a more advantageous position after the Peace Treaty 
became effective and Japanese sovereignty was restored"133 and thus 
were anxious to resolve all issues as soon as possible. The Korean 
negotiators presumed that the Japanese passiveness was derived from 
their intention to prolong the negotiation until the effect of the 
McArthur Line (The boundary which temporarily determined the 
fishing zones of Japan and the Republic of Korea134) was lost when the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect.135 Despite this passive 
position of the Japanese negotiators, it was agreed to have negotiations 
on the following matters; "(1) the legal status of Koreans residing in 
Japan; (2) The ownership of vessels which were within the Korean 
130 Dower, John W., 'The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan in and out of the 
Pentagon Papers', in The Pentagon Papers, vol.V, eds Chomsky, Noam and Zinn, Howard, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1972, p. 117 
131 Confidential Source #1; also see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 21. According to those 
sources, Japanese negotiators remained only as "listeners" throughout the talks. The North 
Korean side supports this point as well. See: Chosen Daigakko, Kan-nichi kaidan no keika to 
honshitsu ni tsuite - sono keika to haikei ni kansuru kosatsu, Chosen daigakko, Tokyo, 1961, p. 
12 
132 Lee Chong-Sik, op. cit., pp. 52-53; Also, Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 21 
133 Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 65. A Korean negotiator judged it similarly; see Kim 
Dong-Jo, 1993, p. 21; see also Lee Chong-Sik, op. cit., p. 53 
134 Defined by Ko; see, Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 60 
135 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 39 
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waters when Japan surrendered in 1945; (3) Property rights and 
claims, which derives from the colonial past; (4) the fishery line 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea; and, (5) diplomatic 
relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea"136 and to form 
committees to discuss each topic from the beginning of the First 
Round Talks.137 
Discussions on the legal status of Koreans and their treatment in Japan 
showed progress, since it was in the interests of both Japan and South 
Korea to resolve the issue. Although they disagreed on the nationality 
of Koreans in Japan, due to the objections by Zainichi toitsu Minshu 
sensen (a DPRK aligned group in Japan), the Japanese showed interest 
in agreeing with the South Korean proposal of defining the status of 
Koreans in Japan as South Koreans.138 During the discussion of those 
matters, it became clear that Japan and the Republic of Korea stood at 
completely different positions. Japan wished to conclude the 
normalisation of relations before any individual property or 
reparations settlement, while the Republic of Korea insisted on 
solving those matters before normalisation.139 The negotiation of 
those matters showed the severe conflict of interests between the two 
countries, resulting in the negotiations being stopped on December 22, 
1951.140 
The Japanese position, as commonly held by politicians and 
bureaucrats, was to await the outcome of the Korean War, but, in the 
meantime to attempt to resolve the problem of the legal status of 
136 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, The Korean View of Korea-
Japan Relations and Japan's Asian Policy, September 1957, p.7. Cited in Chang Young-Gil, op. 
cit., p. 65 
137 
138 
139 
140 
Confidential Source #1; also, Morita Yoshio, op. cit., p. 270 
Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 26-27 
Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 64 
Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 60 
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Koreans in Japan. Despite the intention of the United States to make 
Japan fight in the Korean War, Japan did not want to participate in the 
war by normalising relations with the Republic of Korea, other than 
economically. Japan profited greatly because of this war, which helped 
make a rapid Japanese economic recovery possible. In fact, there was 
no need for Japan to normalise trading relations with the Republic of 
Korea, since trade relations between the two nations had already 
started in 1949 despite the lack of fully normalised diplomatic relations 
being established. 
The reason behind Japan's interest in the legal status of Koreans 
resident in Japan was mainly economic.141 Ogawa Seiryo argues that 
the Japanese government feared the political power of Koreans, and 
attempted to weaken it by deporting them or integrating them into 
Japanese society by allowing Koreans to attend Japanese schools.142 
During the negotiations, the Japanese insisted on treating Koreans in 
the same way as all other foreigners. On the other hand, the Republic 
of Korea insisted on special treatment because the historical origins of 
the Korean residents differentiated them from other foreigners. It was 
pointed out that Koreans were forcibly brought to Japan to work in the 
war industry, or they came to Japan after losing their land in Korea due 
to Japanese confiscation of those lands.143 The Japanese East Asian 
policy on property claims, to not settle the issue of reparations or 
property payments during this period, was reflected in the passivity of 
the Japanese negotiators when discussing this matter with the 
Koreans. 
141 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 25. Kim recalls that the Japanese paid ¥6.5 billion for social 
security benefits in 1950 for 60,000 Koreans in Japan, and was planning to deport them because 
of the expense. 
142 Ogawa Seiryo, 'Zainichi kankokujin no hoteki chi-i taigu. kyotei', in Horitsu jiho, vol. 37, 
September 1965, pp. 31-34 
143 Miyazaki Shigeki, op. cit., p. 25 
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2.2. The First Round Talks 
The first round of negotiation talks was agreed to before the end of the 
preliminary round144, therefore, it was a continuation of the previous 
talks.145 However, the establishment of the 'Peace Line' defined the 
maritime zone by the Republic of Korea generated considerable 
tensions between Japan and the Republic of Korea, making the 
reopening of the negotiation difficult. 
The Republic of Korea, prior to this round, declared the establishment 
of the 'Peace Line' on January 18, 1952. It was designed to replace the 
McArthur Line prior to the San Francisco Treaty coming into effect, 
and was named so by Syngman Rhee.146 The Republic of Korea feared 
that fishing by Japanese ships within South Korean waters would 
cause serious problems for the Korean fishing industry. The Japanese 
reacted aggressively against this Korean initiative.147 The Korean 
declaration was immediately criticised by the United States, which 
supported the Japanese, and was followed by criticism from Taiwan.148 
U.S. General Clark's intervention at this point resulted in an 
agreement between Syngman Rhee and Japanese Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru to re-open the normalisation negotiations.149 
During this round, issues related to (1) basic relations between Japan 
and South Korea (2) the legal status and treatment of Koreans in Japan 
144 Hirobe Kazuya et al., 'Shiryo nikkan kaidan 14 nen no kiseki', in Horitsu jiho, vol. 37, 
September 1965, p. 45; also Gendaishi Kenkyusho, op. cit., p. 1, says that the agreement was 
reached to open the First Round Talks from February the following year. 
l45 Kimura Shuzo, 'Nikkan kosho no kei-i', in Nikkan kankei no tenkai, ed. Tanaka 
Naokichi, Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1963, p. 115 
146 Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 39 
147 ibid., pp. 42-43. The Japanese government and fishermen, who expected the McArthur 
Line to expire, were deeply resentful of the appearance of another line, and showed their anger 
by calling it the 'Rhee Line'. 
148 ibid., p. 41 
149 Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 61. Also see Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 46. Kim mentions both the 
agreement to reopen the meeting and the United States' 'guidance' to reopen the negotiations. 
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(3) the ownership of Japanese vessels remaining in Korea (4) property 
claims and (5) fisheries, were discussed in different committees as 
decided at the preliminary talks. The issue of the legal status of 
Koreans in Japan was intensively discussed, but the talk was 
dominated by the continuing conflict of interest on the fishery issue, 
represented by the problems of the 'Peace Line' and related property 
claims.150 At these talks, possibly for the first time, the Japanese side 
claimed property rights against the Republic of Korea for Japanese 
property remaining in South Korea.151 As previously noted, the 
Japanese priority at the time was to prolong the settlement of the 
property claims issue, thus delaying the accompanying expenditures 
for the payment.152 This tactic was successful. There was also Japanese 
dissatisfaction towards the United States, which gave Japanese private 
property in Korea to South Koreans despite continued Japanese 
interest in it.153 However, discussing this dissatisfaction was likely to 
delay the settlement against the will of the United States which wanted 
normalisation to occur as quickly as possible, as had already occurred 
with the Japan-Taiwan settlement. 
The Koreans were outraged by the Japanese property demand, and 
requested the United States to clarify with the Japanese the 
interpretation of Article 4 of the San Francisco Treaty, which provided 
for the automatic acquisition of Japanese property remaining in Korea 
150 Kimura Shuzo, op. cit., p. 115 
151 Confidential Source#l says that Japan did make a property claim against South Korea 
at the preliminary talks. Also, Kim Dong-jo, says that Japan first claimed Japanese property left 
in Korea at the fifth meeting from March 6, 1952, op. cit., p. 53 
152 Okurasho zaisei shitsu hen, Showa zaisei shi - shusen kara kowa made Vol 1, Toyo 
keizai shinposha, Tokyo, 1984, p. 537; admits that prolonging the settlement benefited Japan in 
terms of economic recovery. Kim Dong-jo shares this view as well; op. cit., p. 56 
l53 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 3. Also, Confidential Source #5 said that this Japanese 
claim was justified by the Hague Convenion in 1907 which could be interpreted as the United 
Nations having the right to acquire Japanese government property in Japan's former colonies, 
but not the private property of Japanese nationals in those countries. Obviously, this 
interpretation was open to challenge. 
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by the Republic of Korea.154 For South Koreans, who abandoned 
reparation claims and compensation demands for Japanese 
colonialism in Korea, and limited its property claim to the minimum 
level in order to realise normalisation, it was a total surprise that the 
Japanese made such a "shameless"155 claim. The United States 
responded to the South Korean plea for clarification of the meaning of 
the article by sending a memorandum to the South Korean 
ambassador to the United States on April 29, stating that Japan was 
unable to claim property left in the Republic of Korea according to 
Article 4(b), but that they could bargain the amount of payment to the 
Republic of Korea by abandoning the property claim lodged against it 
according to Article 4(a).156 
This American interpretation was relayed to the Japanese amba_ssador 
to the United States, Takeuchi, on May 16, but was not officially 
provided to Japan until December 31, 1957.157 This interpretation may 
have been based on American support for the Japanese view that the 
greatest obstacle to normalisation was the issue of property claims. The 
interpretation provided Japan with a means by which it could bargain 
down the property claim by the Republic of Korea,158 reflecting the 
strongly held American view that Japan was the linchpin of its total 
East Asian strategy. This United States act was a miscalculation, if it 
was indeed aimed at rapidly concluding the normalisation treaty. It 
indicated a basic misunderstanding by the United States of the depth of 
feeling against the Japanese in Korea and the determination of the new 
South Korean state to be dealt with in international circles as an equal 
of Japan. Probably, some American officials thought the normalisation 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
ibid., p. 55. This issue was resolved only after 1957. 
Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 54-55 
Kimura Shu.zo, op. cit., p. 116; see also Hirobe Kazuya et al., op. cit., pp. 45-55 
loc. cit. 
Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., pp. 63-64 
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process between Japan and South Korea would be as easy as the Japan-
Taiwan Normalisation Treaty, which only took a year to conclude, 
principally by Taiwan abandoning its right to a property claim against 
Japan. 
Considering the characteristics of Japanese colonialism in Korea, it was 
very difficult for South Korea to abandon its property claim against 
Japan, which, among other political and economic factors, made the 
normalisation process different from that negotiated between Japan 
and Taiwan. Additionally, it was probable that there was also a 
legitimacy problem for Rhee whose popularity essentially rested on his 
anti-Japanese stance. 
Japan kept forcing its property claim on the Republic of Korea, while 
Korea, in return, did not have any intention of letting Japan bargain 
for the claims they were making. As a result, the negotiation was 
recessed in April. Shortly thereafter, the capture of Japanese fishermen 
who crossed the "Peace Line" escalated the conflict. The United States 
dramatically shifted its previous position of supporting the Japanese 
on this issue when they were forced to stop the accelerating conflict 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea by establishing what became 
known as the 'Clark Line' on September 27. Although it almost 
duplicated the 'Peace Line', the official reason presented by the United 
States for establishing this line was to prevent the entry of communists 
and to bloc illegal exports from the Republic of Korea.159 It was, 
however, really aimed at preventing Japanese fishing boats crossing 
the 'Peace Line'. Japan rejected the establishment of this line and 
Japanese fishing boats kept crossing it.160 
159 
160 
Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 43 
ibid., p. 43 
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Despite continuous United States intervention, the Japanese 
negotiator's intention at this round was to avoid paying property 
claims, as in the preliminary talks, and to concentrate on solving the 
problem of the 'Peace Line' and of the legal status of Koreans in Japan. 
In order to counter the Korean demand for early settlement, the 
Japanese claimed Japanese property left in the Republic of Korea before 
the war ended, which they realised was not possible because of Article 
4(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as previously discussed. Kim 
Dong-Jo wrote in his memoir that one of the Japanese negotiators later 
said that they just made up this claim in order to delay the 
settlement161, but he does not specifically state the negotiator. 
The Japanese continued to insist on solving each problem, such as the 
fisheries problem, and the issue of the legal status of Koreans, before 
the settlement of the property claims issue, while the Republic of 
Korea insisted on solving all the issues at once, as in previous talks. 
South Korean negotiators knew that they could use the 'Peace Line' 
issue as a bargaining tool in attempting to resolve other issues. The 
United States intervention during this round through its 
interpretation of Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Treaty did not have 
any impact in resolving the issue, since it was used by Japan to justify 
its claim. 
As the United States did not wish Japan to pay large amounts of 
money to the Republic of Korea in response to its property claims, and 
prioritised Japan's economic recovery, the United States decision not to 
back the Republic of Korea on this issue is understandable. It did not, 
however, assist the normalisation process. The talk was terminated 
161 ibid., p. 56 
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because of the continuing conflict between Japan and South Korea 
over the issue of property claims, since neither side would give in.162 
2.3. Second Round Talks 
The Second Round Talks were began on April 15, 1953 with American 
assistance. United States General Clark privately invited Syngman 
Rhee to a meeting and arranged for him to meet Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru. They subsequently agreed to reopen the talks.163 
These talks were later postponed at Japan's request when the Japanese 
heard about the opening of the Geneva Conference on Korea in April 
1954. The negotiation were then adjourned to July 23, 1954. 
These negotiations were held in five different committees as in the 
First Round Talks. The committees focussed on: (1) basic relations 
between Japan and South Korea; (2) the legal status and treatment of 
Koreans in Japan; (3) the ownership of Japanese vessels remaining in 
South Korea; (4) the South Korean property claim; and (5) fisheries. 
During this three-month negotiation round, Japan maintained its 
previous position of avoiding reaching an agreement on property 
claims before resolution of the two issues of fishery rights and the legal 
status of Korean residents in Japan. The logic here was the same as 
previously: to wait upon the outcome of the Korean War and the 
abolition of the 'Clark Line' after the end of the Korean War. Since the 
'Clark Line' was officially established in order to stop communists 
entering the Republic of Korea, it had to be abolished after the truce 
was signed between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. The 'Clark 
Line' was eventually abolished on August 27, 1953, after the truce 
between South Korea and the DPRK was signed on July 27 the same 
162 
163 
Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 3 
Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 64; also see Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 69 
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year. Japanese negotiators thought they could negotiate on a equal basis 
with the Republic of Korea about the 'Peace Line' after American 
assurances that the 'Peace Line' had been abolished. 
Japanese perspectives, reflected in this round of negotiation, were 
dominated by the economic development centred thinking of 
politicians and bureaucrats, which were shared between the two 
groups. Fishermen's interests did not yet have enough impact to shift 
the Japanese negotiating position to force a rapid settlement of the 
property claims issue. Also, the political and social activities of 
Koreans in Japan was also insignificant in terms of the improvement 
of their status being reflected in the negotiating position of the 
Japanese government, although the activities of Zainichi toitsu 
Minshu sensen (a DPRK aligned group in Japan), made Japanese 
negotiators hesitate in agreeing that all Koreans in Japan would be 
classified as South Korean citizens. During this period, intellectuals 
and the media did not seem to have much interest in the issue either 
and were not influential. 
Summing up the negotiations during the Korean War, it seems 
evident that the prime goal of Japanese and American East Asian 
policies during this period - the economic recovery of Japan- was 
reflected in the Japanese negotiating position throughout the three 
negotiation rounds. The United States wanted the normalisation of 
relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, but their first 
priority was Japanese economic recovery. This was reflected in the 
American initiative to assist the opening of the talks, and in its 
unwillingness to support the Republic of Korea in pressuring Japan to 
accept its conditions. Japanese perspectives during this period were 
dominated by political and bureaucratic orientations, with little, if any, 
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influence being exerted by intellectuals or community groups, or 
indeed, any groups outside government and the bureaucracy. 
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3: NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR TO 
1960 
After the Korean War, the United States maintained its interest 
in normalisation and continued to exercise its influence over the 
issue. Although the United States maintained its support for Japanese 
economic development164 and rearmament, changes in the Japanese 
government, from Yoshida to Hatoyama, Ishibashi then Kishi, 
resulted in different policies being pursued by Japan on the 
normalisation issue. The Rhee regime in the Republic of Korea, on the 
other hand, continued with the same policies until it was overthrown 
by the student revolution in 1960. 
3.1. Third Round Talks 
The abolition of the 'Clark Line' following the signing of the truce 
between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK caused serious conflict 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Following the abolition, 
Japanese fishing boats flooded into the Korean side of the 'Peace Line'. 
South Korea responded to these intrusions by capturing large numbers 
of Japanese fishing boats. Although the number of Japanese boats 
captured by the Republic of Korea was very high and the resultant 
domestic furore in Japan very heated, the United States was initially 
reluctant to intervene in the problem.165 
This massive capture of Japanese fishing boa ts and fishermen by South 
Korea altered the Japanese negotiating position in that the fishery 
problem became one of the major issues. When the numbers of the 
boats captured by the Republic of Korea reached 70, the Japanese 
164 
165 
Chosen daigakko, op. cit., pp. 16-17 
Hatada Takashi et al., op. cit., p. 72 
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government was forced to initiate the opening of the next negotiation 
round. Within this context of a major international dispute and 
significant domestic political pressure, the Third Round Talks were 
thus resumed on October 6, 1953. 
The initiative of the Japanese government in opening the Third 
Round Talks shows that the pressure on the government to resolve 
the fishery problem was serious. Therefore, the approach by the 
Japanese to these talks was precipitated by domestic political 
considerations and, for the first time, the talks were influenced by 
factors other than those associated with Korea's colonial past and 
Japanese imperialist aggression. 
Accordingly, the prime interest of the Japanese negotiators at this 
meeting was the fishery problem. The Japanese demanded the return 
of Japanese fishing boats and fishermen, but the Korean negotiators 
maintained their position, accusing the Japanese of violating the 'Peace 
Line' _166 After this, both sides agreed to hold negotiations in the five 
different committees as in the second round talk, those committees 
meeting on: (1) basic relations between Japan and South Korea; (2) 
the legal status and treatment of Koreans in Japan; (3) the ownership 
of Japanese vessels remaining in Korea; (4) the South Korean 
property claim; and (5) fisheries. 
It was in the committee discussing the property claim during the Third 
Round Talks that the infamous 'Kubota comments' incident took 
place. These comments were made by the chief of the Japanese 
negotiation team, Kubota Kan'ichiro. The comments which infuriated 
the Korean negotiators were that "Thirty-six years of Japanese 
166 Kimura Shuzo, op. cit., p. 117 
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colonisation of Korea was beneficial for Koreans" and that the 
description in the Cairo Declaration that "Japan enslaved Koreans, 
was an hysteric expression of Allied nations during the war."167 The 
Korean negotiators were outraged by these comments, and demanded 
Kubota apologise. Kubota responded by saying that his comments were 
"not wrong". The negotiation was thus terminated.168 Both Japan and 
the Republic of Korea blamed the other side for disrupting the talks.169 
These comments made by the chief negotiator reflected typical 
Japanese attitudes towards Korea at the time. The break up of the 
negotiation was the result of two very different perspectives. The 
Japanese attitude was to justify the colonisation of Korea and to argue 
that Japan's rule was good for Korea by developing its infrastructure. 
However, the attitudes shared by the Korean government, including 
Syngman Rhee, were the opposite. The government of the Republic of 
Korea was firmly convinced that their nation was exploited and 
victimised by Japanese colonisation and approached the normalisation 
talks from this perspective. 
3.2. Fourth Round Talks 
The establishment of Hatoyama regime worsened the conflict between 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, bringing what was termed 1hostage 
167 According to the South Korean record of the negotiation talks; see Sasaki Ryuji, op. cit., 
p. 123 
168 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., pp. 3-5. Maeda attended the meeting when this incident 
took place. He recalls that a top-level politician talked to Kubota at the end of the meeting and 
said that despite all the 'serious discussion' that day, he wished that both Japan and South 
Korea would overcome the obstacles and conclude the treaty. The Japanese side at this point 
was not expecting the Korean side to terminate the talks. Probably it was partly due to South 
Korean tactics to use the 'Kubota Comments' as a bargaining tool. This is clear from the later 
reaction of South Koreans to similar comments made by Sawada Renzo, Takasugi Shinichi and 
Shina Etsusaburo. The 'Kubota Comments' were the only statement criticised by the South 
Koreans. 
169 Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 85, 90 . This comment was initially supported by the 
government . 
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diplomacy,170 between the two countries. Japan detained Koreans who 
tried to enter Japan illegally, and the Republic of Korea continued to 
capture fishermen who crossed the 'Peace Line'. The Japanese Foreign 
Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu negotiated the reopening of talks by 
retracting the 'Kubota comments' and reached an agreement with the 
Republic of Korea about the mutual release of those detained, only to 
find that the agreement was rejected by Justice Ministry bureaucrats171 
who did not agree with the idea of compromising on the status of 
Koreans in Japan, despite the political need to reopen the negotiations. 
This action was indicative of the strength of central ministry 
bureaucrats at this time, particularly with regard to these negotiations, 
and of their disregard for political solutions. 
One of the reasons why bilateral relations worsened during the 
Hatoyama government was the close ties it established with various 
communist regimes. Hatoyama announced a new foreign policy which 
he titled 'autonomous people's diplomacy'172 aimed at establishing a 
more autonomous, less American aligned diplomacy. He began to 
improve relations with the DPRK, the People's Republic of China and 
the USSR, initiatives which would obviously displease South Korea. 
Although the South Korean Vice Foreign Minister was informed by 
the Japanese government on June 17 that Japan did not intend to 
resume relations with the DPRK, Japanese news reporters, academics 
and businessmen were allowed to visit Pyongyang after this.173 Japan-
China trade during the Hatoyama government dramatically increased 
170 
171 
172 
ibid., p. 108-113 
Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 86 
ibid., p. 76 
173 ibid., p. 80; also see Kim Dong-Jo, ibid., p. 109. This was in response to the proposal by 
Kim Il Sung, then premier of the DPRK, to normalise relations with Japan on February 25th, 
1955. 
54 
---
--
~I 
I: 
h 
I 
J 
I 
I 
j 
I 
1, 
~ 
' 
I 
,(• 
•l 
p 
II 
I 
l ; 
by 50% from 1954 to 1955.174 Negotiation of a Peace Treaty with the 
USSR was started in 1955. In October 1956, Japan succeeded in signing a 
fisheries agreement with the USSR, followed by a similar treaty with 
the PRC.175 
It was difficult for Japan to ask for American assistance to pressure 
South Korea to open the Fourth Round Talks because the United 
States had just succeeded in convincing a reluctant Syngman Rhee to 
resume a truce with the DPRK.176 The United States therefore 
pressured Japan to apologise for the 'Kubota comments' while, at the 
same time, pressuring Syngman Rhee to reopen the negotiations. 
While this was accomplished, the positions of both nations was 
unchanged.177 American Secretary of the State Dulles attempted to 
bring about the mutual release of those who were detained. The 
agreement on the mutual release was reached due to this American 
effort, and even though it was not implemented due to the opposition 
of bureaucrats as mentioned, it does nevertheless demonstrated the 
continuing degree of influence of the United States over Japan and 
Sou th Korea. 
The interactions of Japan with communist countries drove the South 
Korean government to suspend trade with Japan in August 1955. After 
this, Walter Robertson, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs, consulted with Rhee and Hatoyama, in order to 
promote the reopening of the negotiations. However, this attempt 
failed as it was rejected by a Japanese Cabinet decision in December 
1956.178 The aggressive stance by the Republic of Korea derived from 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 77 
ibid., p. 90 
Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 89 
ibid., p. 89 
Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 93 
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renewed American commitment to supporting it economically ·and 
militarily after the Korean War. Thus, in the absence of overt pressure 
from the United States, Korea could afford to indulge its continuing 
anti-Japanese sentiment in the negotiation process. The need for South 
Korea to secure payment from the Japanese for property claims was 
rendered less urgent by increased American aid. Also, Japanese 
attempts to resume relations with the PRC, USSR and DPRK during 
the period of the Hatoyama government were unacceptable to the 
Rhee regime, which was therefore willing to stall negotiations until 
this policy changed. 
The resumption of the talks seemed possible when Ishibashi Tanzan 
took over from Hatoyama as Prime Minister. He showed his intention 
to normalise relations with the Republic of Korea by "abandoning 
everything we could"179 in respect of Japanese claims, giving hope to 
the Korean side. However, he retired after only two months because of 
illness. It was therefore through the initiative of Kishi Nobusuke, who 
became Prime Minister on February 25, 1957, that the negotiations 
were reopened. 
Kishi showed an obvious interest in an early rapprochement between 
the two nations.180 On February 25, 1957, Kishi personally met Kim 
Dong-Jo, who was responsible for the negotiations at the time, and told 
him of his determination to normalise relations between Japan and 
South Korea, asking that a message to this effect be delivered to 
Rhee.181 Kishi also wanted a resolution of the fishery problem, 
mentioning the detention of fishermen from his electorate in 
179 
180 
Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 114 
ibid., p. 117 
181 ibid., pp. 114-117; also see Yamamoto Tsuyoshi, 'Kan-nichi kankei to Yatsugi Kazuo', 
in Kokusai seiji, vol. 75, October 1983, pp. 43-56 
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Yamaguchi Prefecture.182 Considering the number of fishing boats 
captured was 152 and the number of fishermen detained amounted to 
2025 in 1957, the political pressure placed on Kishi is obvious.183 The 
reason behind his interest in the negotiation could also be that he was 
receiving secret cash contributions from the American Central 
Intelligence Agency through his brother Sato Eisaku, then the Finance 
Minister .184 
During the negotiations to reopen the formal talks, Japan maintained 
its position of pursuing the right to claim Japanese property left in 
Korea. The United States, upon the request of Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, repeated the interpretation of Article 4 of the San Francisco 
Treaty which it had previously provided to South Korean and 
Japanese government.185 This enabled Japan to demand property 
rights of Korea in case the amount of property compensation the 
Republic of Korea demanded from Japan was too large.186 The Japanese 
tactic was to abandon the right to claim property once the negotiations 
were re-opened, but leave the possibility in the agreement so that they 
could bring up the issue in case the Korean property claim was 
enormous. Also, the Japanese Foreign Ministry delayed the mutual 
182 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 116 
183 Morita Yoshio, op. cit., pp. 271-272. A resolution was made with support from both the 
ruling and opposition parties, to solve the problem of those detained fishing boats and 
fishermen. The resolution was made twice in 1952, five times in 1953, five times in 1955 and 
once in 1956. The lack of action indicates the inability of the political system at this stage to cope 
with such difficult issues, no matter what the influences acting upon it were; also Confidential 
Source #2 confirmed that the fishery problem was probably one of the most serious issues 
around this period. 
184 New York Times, October 9, 1994, p. 1. 'C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese 
Right in 50' s and 60' s'. 
185 Confidential Source #5 said that Japan requested the American interpretation; For the 
South Korean view, see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 128 
186 Confidential Source #5. From the Japanese point of view, this American 
interpretation became the basis of the Japanese position to bargain over what the Japanese 
bureaucrats thought would be an exceptionally large property claim by South Korea. It formed 
the basis of an intended Japanese counter-claim. He also said that Japanese private property left 
in Korea was valued at more than the South Korean property claim against the Japanese. This 
perhaps indicates the pragmatic harshness with which the Japanese bureaucrats were willing to 
defend what they perceived to be the Japanese national interest in the negotiations. For the 
South Korean view see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 128-130 
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release of those detained by Japan and South Korea by announcing the 
sending to the DPRK of 53 of the Koreans detained, who wished to go 
there.187 Kim Dong-Jo observed that some of the officials in the 
Foreign Ministry were connected to a faction within the LOP opposed 
to the Kishi faction, which therefore made the negotiations difficult. 
Additionally, these bureaucrats could also have been acting from 
profit-centred bureaucratic motives.188 Foreign Minister Fujiyama, 
seemingly factionally opposed to Kishi, also avoided reopening the 
normalisation talks, opposing some LOP members who were "acting 
on the advice of Prime Minister Kishi", and were attempting to 
intervene politically in the negotiations to reopen the talks.189 
Kishi, in order to reopen the negotiations, sent a personal envoy 
Yatsugi Kazuo, to Rhee on May 19, 1958.190 Thus, the Fourth Round 
Talks were opened on April 15, by formal Japanese withdrawal of the 
'Kubota comments' and of the property claim against Korea. It was 
agreed to discuss the issues of; (1) basic relations between Japan and 
the Republic of Korea; (2) the legal status and treatment of Koreans 
residing in Japan; (3) the Republic of Korea property claim against 
Japan; and (4) fisheries and the 'Peace Line'. Despite the positive 
attitude of Kishi, the negotiation did not progress, since both sides 
were in conflict on all the issues.191 
187 Kim Dong-Jo, ibid., p. 139 
188 Confidential Source #4 said that he was not going to sacrifice the Japanese national 
interest for a quick solution to the fishery problems. This illustrates again that political 
interests differed from bureaucratic interests, with bureaucrats quite willing to take a hard, 
narrow, long term view almost regardless of the short term consequences. He also said that his 
priority at the time was the North Pacific Fishery Treaty negotiations with the United States, 
not the South Korean negotiations. It seems probable that it was not a priority for the 
bureaucrats to negotiate with South Korea at the time. 
189 Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 110. A good-will visit to South Korea by Fujiyama was 
planned by those LDP members who were aligned with Kishi, but Fujiyama refused to visit 
South Korea. 
190 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 143-148 
191 ibid., p. 149; Confidential Source #2 said that the Japanese were willing to solve the 
problems, but the South Koreans did not show any interest until the autumn of that year, 1958. 
Probably they were both interested in solving the issue, but to their own advantage; both 
parties were unwilling to give in to the other. 
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This negotiation was almost jeopardised because of a Japanese plan to 
send Koreans wishing to be so repatriated to the DPRK. According to 
Kim Dong-Jo, this Japanese plan was initiated by the Zainihon 
chosenjin sorengokai -usually abbreviated to Chosoren (a DPRK aligned 
organisation which was formed from Zainichi toitsu minshu sensen 
in 1955).192 Zai nihon daikan minkoku kyorya mindan - usually 
abbreviated to Mindan (a South Korean aligned organisation 
established in 1946) countered this attempt, but failed due to poor 
funding and organisation compared to Chosoren.193 Kim Dong-Jo 
argues that the Japanese Foreign, Minister Fujiyama Ai-ichiro, pushed 
this issue for economic advantage, while Prime Minister Kishi 
attempted to stop the plan, until its success became apparent.194 
Fujiyama, the head of Nihon shoko kaigisho (Japan Chamber of 
Commerce), was economically centred, while Kishi was politically 
centred in approach. This conflict between the Prime Minister and his 
Foreign Minister, who were factionally opposed within the LDP, 
illustrates the weakness of the Japanese political system, particularly 
the LDP of the time, in resolving contentious issues in a disciplined 
way. It can also be hypothesised that the Foreign Minister was assisted 
in his policy by the bureaucrats in his own and other ministries who 
may have had views opposed to those of the Prime Minister. 
192 ibid., pp. 122, 153-159. Chosoren first sent 20 Koreans to the DPRK, with the assistance 
of the International Red Cross. The Red Cross approved of this because Chosoren told them that 
600,000 Koreans wished to go back to the DPRK, but were unable to do so because of South 
Korean obstruction. Chosoren also advocated the unification of Korea, better treatment of 
Koreans in Japan, the promotion of racial education of Koreans in Japan, and the 
normalisation of relations between North Korea and Japan. 
193 Mitchell, Richard H. The Korean Minority in Japan, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1967, p. 125; "During the late 1950's some members of Mindan exerted pressure on 
South Korea to speed up negotiations with the Japanese and to come to an agreement, in order 
to improve the position of the Koreans in Japan." Their attempt was not so significant because 
they were not influential enough to stop the Japanese government from sending Koreans to 
the DPRK. This also implies that Chosoren had a significant impact on the Japanese 
government, despite its official stance towards the DPRK. The source of this influence is not 
known, although it could well have been through an association with the Socialist Party 
and/or with particular members of that party. 
194 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 138-227 
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The Japanese Welfare Ministry attempted to reduce social security 
payments to Korean residents, of which "the number of recipients was 
ten times higher for Koreans than for Japanese."195 It is possible that 
there was pressure from the Finance Ministry, as well as the Welfare 
Ministry for Fujiyama to send Koreans to the DPRK, thereby, saving 
¥2,600 million which was paid annually to Koreans from 1952 to 
1956.196 South Korean attention became focused on stopping this, 
while Japanese negotiators maintained the position that this issue was 
irrelevant to the normalisation negotiation.197 This clearly illustrates 
the view that Korea saw the treatment of Koreans in Japan as an 
international issue, while Japan tried to classify it as a domestic issue. 
Japan requested the United States to influence the Republic of Korea to 
reopen the negotiations until the attempted repatriation of Koreans to 
the DPRK seemed successfuI.198 Despite the Republic of Korea's request 
to stop this attempt, the United States was unable to actively oppose 
this issue, since 'freedom to choose where you live' was acknowledged 
by International Convention.199 When it became apparent that this 
plan was acknowledged by the International Red Cross, the United 
States Department of State made an announcement to support this 
plan.200 Demonstrating support for the Japanese regime was probably 
the most crucial aim for the United States, once they realised that they 
could not stop the Japanese from this. The Republic of Korea 
continued its attempt to stop the sending of Koreans to the DPRK, but 
lost interest after the first ship with 975 of over eighty thousand 
195 
1% 
197 
Mitchell, op. cit., p. 130 
ibid., p. 130 
Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 161 
198 ibid., p. 210; also Confidential Source #2 said that this issue was 'irrelevant' for the 
normalisation talks, therefore the Japanese maintained a willingness to re-open the talks. 
l99 ibid ., p. 207 
200 Hirobe Kazuya et al., op. cit., pp. 45-55 
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Koreans left Japan on December 14, 1959.201 Japan-Korea trade was re-
opened and the normalisation talks were resumed due to American 
pressure and the economic difficulties Korea was experiencing at the 
time.202 However, the talks were stopped after only a day as Syngman 
Rhee was overthrown by the student revolution. 
Examining the influence of American intervention and the Korean 
position after the Korean War to 1960, the regime change in Japan had 
a significant influence. Increasing demands by the United States for 
Japan to rearm and strengthen its ties with American aligned nations 
in Asia conflicted with Japanese economic interests during the 
Hatoyama regime. Hatoyama's 'autonomous people's policy' reflected 
Japanese business needs to re-establish economic relations with 
countries other than the United States, therefore were against 
American will to keep Japan within the bloc of American-aligned 
nations. The Japanese government also faced a legitimacy problem 
because of pressure by the fishing industry to resolve the dispute over 
fishing rights with South Korea. The Japanese side initiated the 
opening of both the Third and Fourth Round Talks, largely due to the 
capture of Japanese fishermen and fishing boats by the Republic of 
Korea, and political pressure on the government. American pressure 
also contributed to the opening of the fourth round negotiations in 
terms of making the Japanese side give up its property claim against 
Japanese property left in Korea. This was assisted through Kishi's 
personal intervention, who was receiving cash contributions from the 
CIA.203 
201 The South Korean Embassy in Japan even attempted to bomb the Japan Red Cross at 
the beginning of December in order to stop the return of Koreans to the DPRK; see Mazaki 
Mitsuharu, Kokusai mondai shirizu 27 nikkan kosho - sono keika to mondai ten, N ihon 
kokusai mondai kenkyilsho, Tokyo, 1962, p. 20 
202 Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 116 
203 New York Times, op. cit., p.l 
61 
Despite the United States political interests in the negotiations, and 
some Japanese politicians' support for the normalisation, Japanese 
bureaucrats remained opposed to accepting the Korean conditions.204 
The Welfare Ministry, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Finance, as well as the Foreign Ministry were determined to send 
Koreans to the DPRK, even though it would have jeopardised the 
normalisation negotiations with South Korea. The attitudes of some of 
the Japanese negotiators towards colonialism in Korea was also the 
basis for severe conflict with the Korean negotiators, terminating the 
Third Round Talks. Whether this was done purposely can only be 
guessed at. The impact of Chosoren activity, which influenced the 
Japanese government to send Koreans to the DPRK, was significant in 
a way that it succeeded in making the Japanese government agree with 
the interests of a well organised community group.205 In this stage of 
the negotiations, two community groups had emerged to influence the 
government; the fisheries organisations and Chosoren . 
204 Confidential Source #2 says Japan was estimating the amount of the South Korean 
property claim as being around $US800 million, which was based on the amount of reparations 
paid to the Philippines. He stated that Japan could not possibly accept the South Korean 
demand of $US8,000 million for reparations. 
205 Confidential Source #2 insisted that this issue was totally 'irrelevant' to the Japanese 
negotiating position. He also said that he was reporting directly to the Prime Minister at the 
time. It is possible to hypothesise that both the negotiators and Prime Minister Kishi were 
promoting the negotiations, while some bureaucrats and the Foreign Minister, as well as some 
LDP members were against it. 
62 
4: Negotiations From 1960 To The Conclusion Of The Treaty 
The negotiations from 1960 reflected major changes in the South 
Korean stance due to the overthrow of the Rhee government, as well 
as changes in the nature of American containment and hegemonic 
projects. These change were reflected in the Japanese policy changes 
initiated by Prime Minister Ikeda, who took over from Kishi in 1960. 
4.1. Fifth Round Talks 
Economic strains on the United States brought on by the expense of its 
containment and hegemonic projects surfaced as the replacement of 
direct aid by loan to American aligned nations in Asia. This was 
initially done through the Development Loan Fund in 1957, and 
subsequently was endorsed in 1961 by the passing of the Overseas 
Assistance Act.206 American military support for South Korea also 
decreased.207 The revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 
1960 enabled the United States to shift a part of its financial burden for 
its military bases to Japan by allowing more autonomy to Japan in its 
security and foreign policies. 
Prime Minister Ikeda, who took over from Kishi, presented broad 
economic policy goals as the basis of the rapid re-building of the 
Japanese nation. His priorities were; (1) to double GDP; (2) to 
normalise relations with South Korea; (3) to separate politics from 
economic issues. 208 
206 Kasai Nobusachi, op. cit., p. 328 
207 Ha Young-Sun, 'America-Korean Military Relations: Continuity and Change', in 
Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-
Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, p. 118. "The South Koreans also had to face 
the MAP Transfer Program and a decrease in security-supporting assistance for defence budget 
support." 
208 Abe Hirozumi et al., 'Nikkan joyaku', in Nihon gaikoshi II, ed. Abe Hirozumi et al., 
Mainichi shinbun sha, Tokyo, 1974, p . 559 
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When President Rhee was overthrown by the student revolution, the 
....., 
United States supported the newly established Chang Myon 
government, which assured the Japanese that it would re-start 
negotiations on the normalisation issue. South Korea, therefore, 
showed a clear interest in finalising arrangements for normalisation 
with Japan. The post-Rhee interim government announced that 
normalisation with Japan was "the top priority issue."209 Chang Myon, 
who became Prime Minister on August 23, 1960 continued this 
stance.210 This was a significant change from the Rhee government 
which had been dominated in its negotiating stance by Rhee's virulent 
anti-Japanese views.211 
Judging the intention of the Chang My'5n government to normalise 
relations with Japan as genuine,212 the Japanese Foreign Minister 
Kosaka visited South Korea. This was the first such visit by a Japanese 
Foreign Minister to South Korea, and resulted in the two nations 
agreeing to the re-opening of the normalisation negotiations in 
October 1960.213 This visit was even more significant, in that, it marked 
the first major initiative on the talks taken by politicians rather than by 
Japanese bureaucrats. 
The preparatory talks for re-opening the official Fifth Round Talks, 
were opened on October 25, 1960, with South Korea compromising by 
agreeing not to interfere with the Japanese discussions on the issue of 
209 Mazaki Mitsuharu, op. cit., p. 22 
210 Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 117. His major policies were reconstruction of the South 
Korean economy and normalization with Japan. 
211 Confidential Source #4 said that probably the normalisation treaty would not have 
been concluded during the Rhee regime; also Kim Dong-Jo quotes Rhee's comment that the 
normalisation with Japan should not be concluded until at least South Koreans above 40 years 
old pass away. See Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 123-124 
212 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 5. In August 1960, the South Korean Minister of Foreign 
Affairs suggested that the negotiations be re-opened in Seoul. 
213 Morita Yoshio, 1991, p. 273 
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the repatriation of Koreans resident in Japan to the DPRK.214 During 
the meeting it was agreed to discuss issues in four committees meeting 
simultaneously as in the Fourth Round Talks. These committees were 
to discuss, respectively; (1) diplomatic relations between Japan and 
South Korea; (2) property claims by South Korea against Japan; (3) 
fishery issues and the 'Peace Line'; and (4) the legal status of Koreans 
in Japan.215 
Despite the initial expectations of the Japanese that they could reach an 
agreement, continued widespread unrest in South Korea implied no 
guarantee of the survival of the Chang Myon regime. They therefore 
became passive towards the end of the negotiation216 until South 
Korea showed their intention to abandon the 'Peace Line'. This 
concession occurred after the meeting of Iseki Yujiro, Japanese Foreign 
Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau Chief and Kim Yon-shik, Vice Minister 
of the South Korean Foreign Ministry. Since the fishery issue was one 
of the major obstacles in the negotiations, it was a significant change 
for the better. However, the preparatory talks were stopped by the 
South Korean coup d'etat on May 16 the following year, thus justifying 
the Japanese concerns about the stability of the Chang Myon 
government.217 Therefore, the formal talks were not re-opened. 
The Japanese negotiating position from 1960 reflected political and 
economic interests in promoting normalisation, which was supported 
by the pro-Japanese stance of Chang Myon government. Pro-South 
214 
215 
Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 236-237 
Kimura Shuzo, 1963, p. 121 
216 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 6. Maeda, one of the principal negotiators involved in all 
the negotiation rounds, recollects that Chang Myo'n's leadership was weak, resulting in 
divisive struggles within the South Korean ruling party. This made the negotiations difficult 
for the Japanese as they had little confidence in any agreements being adhered to by South 
Korea if the Chang My~n government was to be overthrown. 
217 Confidential Source #2 said that the normalisation treaty might have been settled 
earlier if this regime had continued. 
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Korea politicians such as Kishi Nobusuke and Sato Eisaku formed 
'Nikkan mondai konshin kai' (The Discussion Committee on 
Japanese-Korean Relations) within the Liberal Democratic Party on 
April 1961, and eight members visited South Korea in May of that 
year.218 This group also included Tanaka Kakuei, who was beginning 
to forge his political career through strong links to the business 
community. Japanese businessmen flooded into South Korea after a 
visa was given to a representative of Mitsubishi on August 17, 1960, 
reflecting the strong residual interest in South Korea on the part of the 
business community, which, it must remembered, had treated Korea 
as part of the Japanese economy for most of the past fifty years.219 
However, Ikeda had to be cautious on the normalisation issue since 
his predecessor Kishi was forced to resign on July 19, 1960, because of 
overwhelming objections against the conclusion of the Japan-United 
States Mutual Security Treaty.220 During the Anpo toso (The 
movements against the ratification of Japan-United States Security 
Treaty), students broke into the Diet and confronted police, which 
resulted in one student's death. Over 300,000 people demonstrated a 
day before the ratification of the treaty, gathering around the Diet 
building, but it was secretly ratified nonetheless. Kishi, fearing the 
reaction of the people, decided to resign.221 Ikeda, who took over Kishi 
after this massive popular movement, were afraid of the revival of 
this movement if he promoted Japan-South Korean normalisation 
immediately. Also, Chosoren' s activity against the normalisation 
218 Abe Hirozumi, 1974, p. 559. Pro-South Korea politicians such as Kishi Nobusuke and 
Sato Eisaku formed 'Nikkan mondai konshin kai' (The Discussion Committee on Japanese-
Korean Relations) on April 1961, and 8 members visited South Korea in May; see also Chang 
Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 117 
219 Lee Chong-Sik, op. cit., p. 67 
220 ibid., p. 68 
221 Abe Hirozumi et al. (b), 'Anpo Taisei', in Nihon gaikoshi II, ed. Abe Hirozumi et al., 
Mainichi shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1974, p. 558 
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might have had some impact on Ikeda's position. Chosoren discussed 
the 'ways of unifying Korea' with Mindan in January 1961, claiming 
that the normalisation would be an obstacle to the unification of 
Korea.222 This position was reinforced by the socialist and communist 
members of the Diet, with which Chosoren had close relations. 223 Both 
Socialist and Communist Parties announced support for Chosoren on 
April 19, 1961, where more than 6000 Japanese rallied to this cause.224 
The instability of the South Korea regime, of course, became another 
reason for Japan to be cautious in continuing the negotiations. During 
this period, the interest of the business community and the pro-South 
Korean group, lead by Kishi, did not have enough impact on the 
Japanese negotiating position to progress the talks. 
4.2. Sixth Round Talks 
The coup d'etat of May 1961 in South Korea again brought changes to 
the South Korean stance on normalisation. Park Chung Hee, who 
came to power through the coup d'etat, announced the goal of 
achieving normalisation with Japan as a priority.225 Park announced a 
plan to return the government to civilian control by the end of 1963 
and justified the military junta by stressing the necessity of reforming 
the country.226 South Korean officials told Japanese Foreign Ministry 
officials that South Korea wanted to receive Japanese assistance for 
economic recovery and wished to normalise relations with Japan.227 
222 
223 
Mitchel, 1967, p. 148 
loc. cit. 
ibid., p. 149 224 
225 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 6. He visited South Korea after the coup d'etat to observe 
and report to the Foreign Ministry on the situation in the country and the intentions of the 
Park regime. 
226 loc. cit. 
227 loc. cit. Maeda, after the trip to South Korea, reported to the Foreign Ministry that the 
Park Regime was 'full of enthusiasm' about resolving the normalisation issue. 
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This demonstrated a radical departure on the part of South Korea and 
underlined the pragmatic stance of the Park regime - a position 
opposite to that of the Rhee government. Japanese Prime Minister 
Ikeda and Foreign Minister Kosaka convinced President Kennedy and 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk to support the Park regime, resulting in 
Kennedy's statement on July 28, 1961 supporting it.228 After 
intervention by Edwin Reischauer, the American ambassador to Japan, 
and Samuel Burger, his counterpart in South Korea229, the 
negotiations were reopened in October 1961. 
American intervention continued during this period. Dean Rusk met 
Ikeda the following month, emphasising the strategic importance of 
South Korea and particularly Japan's role in stabilising the political 
situation and the economy of South Korea.230 As the situation in 
Vietnam worsened following the assassination of President Diem on 
November 1, 1963, United States' pressure for Japan to normalise 
relations with South Korea increased further. In January 1964, United 
States Secretary of State Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State William 
P. Bundy visited South Korea and announced American support for 
the normalisation of South Korea and Japan relations.231 Rusk again 
made a statement on January 28, 1964 that "early rapprochement of the 
South Korea-Japan negotiation is beneficial for the entire liberal 
world."232 
The Sixth Round Talks were opened from October 20, 1961. The 
significance of this meeting was that both sides recognised the limits of 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
Chong Sik-Lee, 1989, pp. 72-73 
Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 249 
Abe Hirozumi et al., op. cit., p. 561 
Okonogi Masao, op. cit., p. 137 
Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 99 
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diplomatic negotiations, and agreed to hold political negotiations at 
the same time.233 As a result, Park Chung Hee visited Japan on 
November 11, and held a meeting with Prime Minister Ikeda. At the 
meeting, Park implied that South Korea would not claim property as 
reparations, and that it would re-consider the issue of the 'Peace Line' 
if Japan showed sincerity on the issue of its property claim.234 As a 
result, a meeting of foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea was 
held in March 1962. 
This meeting was not very productive, since the Japanese 
government's position on one particular territorial issue, that Take 
shima (Take Island) was claimed as Japanese territory, was reported in 
the newspaper the day of the meeting.235 The issue of this island was 
one of the issues under negotiation, with South Korea insisting that 
the island belonged to it, calling it Tok-Do (Tok-Island). It is not known 
if this report in the Japanese press was intentional or not, or what its 
purpose was. It may have been co-incidental, or it may have been a 
leak from a Minis try opposed to the position being taken on the talks 
by the Japanese government. Given the traditionally intimate 
relationships between ministries and their press clubs, the latter 
interpretation is not improbable and would indicate continuing 
conflict between bureaucrats and politicians on the best course for the 
negotiations. 
After the re-election of the Ikeda government in July 1962, it became 
actively concerned with the normalisation issue, rating it as one of its 
policy priorities. Around late spring or the beginning of summer in 
1962, the Japanese Foreign Minister met with the bureaucrats involved 
233 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 256 
234 ibid., p. 263; Maeda also said that the property claim issue became the centre of the 
discussion; see Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 7 
235 "b"d 7 1 1 ., p. 
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in the negotiation process - Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry and 
Finance Ministry officials- to consider the negotiating position in 
relation to the property claim against Japan. This meeting indicated the 
growing control of the negotiations by politicians and may have been 
indicative of the realisation by the government that the impasse which 
the bureaucrats had maintained for many years was becoming 
unproductive and may actually do Japan more harm economically and 
politically if it was to continue for much longer. 
The meeting concluded that: (1) the settlement of property claims 
could be made difficult if South Korea had to provide evidence for the 
claims, since that evidence would be old. Furthermore, they might not 
be able to get all the evidence needed to substantiate the claim against 
Japan; (2) in order to solve this problem, it would be necessary for 
Japan to provide economic assistance through grants and loans instead 
of direct payments for the property claimed by South Korea, thus 
reducing the direct cost; and (3) it would also be necessary for the 
South Korean government to recognise that it did not have any right 
to pursue further property claims against Japan after receiving the 
economic assistance, because assistance provided would be made as 
payment for all Korean property claims against Japan.236 
Following these decisions, Japan at last had a definite negotiating 
position from which a property settlement could be reached. 
Subsequently, at a meeting between Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira 
and Korean Central Intelligence Agency chief Kim Jong-pil on 
November 12, 1962, both sides agreed on the amount of the property 
claim.237 This amounted to payment by Japan to South Korea of a 
236 ibid., p. 8 
237 Confidential Source #5 said that the Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry made an 
estimate of the maximum Japan could accept as a South Korean claim prior to the meeting; 
Confidential Source #2 implied that the amount of the property claim was negotiated prior to 
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$US300 million direct grant plus $US200 million aid, plus $US100 
million of low interest, long term, officially approved investment 
loans from private sources.238 The agreement was incorporated in 
what became known as the 'Kin-Ohira Memo' (Kim-Ohira 
Memorandum), and was a landmark of the normalisation 
negotiations, since it resolved the biggest obstacle to normalisation; the 
issue of the South Korean property claim.239 It was also agreed at the 
meeting that the payment would be deemed to be 'economic 
cooperation' by Japan, but was to be interpreted as 'a property claim' by 
South Korea.240 The Japanese aim here was to stop the South Korean 
government from asking for further reparations or property claims 
against Japan after this settlement.241 On December 15, South Korean 
negotiators presented the numbers of Koreans who died or were 
injured through forced labour by the Japanese Imperial government. 
They estimated 77,684 dead and 25,000 injured, claiming $US364 
this meeting, where Japan was willing to pay up to the same amount as it had paid to the 
Philippines; i.e. $US800 million, whereas South Korea claimed $US8 billion; Kim Dong-Jo said 
that the amount of the property claim was first discussed after the Park regime was established; 
see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 266 
238 Sasaki Ryuji, op. cit., p. 133-134; see also Takasaki Soji, 'Nikkan joyaku de hosho wa 
kaiketsu shitaka', in Sekai, vol. 572, September 1992, pp. 40-47; also Dong-A Ilbo, June 22, 1991, 
p.5 
239 Confidential Source #5 strongly emphasised that the amount of the South Korean 
property claim was the biggest problem to be solved. He also said that the settlement of other 
issues followed this settlement and were therefore dependent on it, at least from the Japanese 
perspective. 
240 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 274. He also quoted the then Minister of International Trade 
and Industry, Sato Eisaku, as saying that Japan could not pay the property claim to South Korea 
as reparations, because it then "acknowledges Japanese illegally invaded and forcibly occupied 
Korea". Also Confidential Source #5 said that it was a 'gift' from Japan to South Korea for 
economic development, thus confirming that, the interpretation of the implications of 
formally paying reparations was shared by senior politicians and bureaucrats. When it is 
considered that Sato was in one of the groups pushing for an early conclusion of the treaty, and 
was relatively pro-Korean, one gets some idea of the depth of resistance of those who were 
actively opposed to it. 
241 Tanaka Hiroshi, op. cit., p. 202. A Foreign Ministry official made a statement on this 
issue at the Diet in August 1991, commenting that the normalisation treaty of 1965 did not 
overturn the right of South Korean citizens to make property claims against Japan, as only 
claims by the South Korean state were included in the treaty and limited by its terms. Also see 
Takasaki Soji, op. cit., p. 40-47. Takasaki points out that the money paid to South Korea was 
mostly used for economic development. Of this, only 5.4% was allocated to those South 
Koreans who lost their property left in Japan. He argues that since the money was paid by Japan 
as 'economic cooperation', South Koreans should be able to make individual claims against the 
Japanese government. 
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million for reparations, only to find this refused by the Japanese. 242 
Following this, Park Chung Hee approved the agreement achieved at 
the Ohira-Kim meeting through an announcement on December 27, 
1962.243 Park probably chose to normalise relations with Japan at this 
stage and receive 'economic cooperation', rather than prolonging the 
negotiations and continuing to demand payment of the Korean 
estimates of reparations or property claims related to the numbers of 
dead and injured Koreans. The latter course would not guarantee 
payment of the South Korean demands and more negotiations would 
hamper economic development at a time when the nation required 
substantial funds for Park's industrialisation policies.244 
In 1963, a plan to abandon the 'Peace Line' and to establish alternative 
measures to utilise national marine resources in South Korea, was 
proposed by Japan. This proposal was influenced by the new 
movement in international law to establish 12 mile national maritime 
zones to define territorial wa ters245 and by a meeting between the 
Japanese and South Korean Agriculture and Fisheries ministers, 
another political level initiative. The Japanese proposal was: (1) to set 
a 12-mile territorial sea limit for fishing in both Japan and South 
Korea; (2) to establish common fishery territorial zones between Japan 
and South Korea which both nations could use; and (3) to provide 
Japanese assistance to South Korea to develop its fishing industry.246 
Kim Dong-Jo, the chief South Korean negotiator then, met Sato Eisaku, 
242 
243 
Takasaki Soji, op. cit., p. 45-46 
Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 8 
244 Confidential Source #6 was sent to South Korea as an envoy in May 1963, to relay a 
message on the property claim issue from Prime Minister Ikeda. Although this source did not 
reveal the contents of the message, it could be assumed that the settlement of this issue was 
further negotiated after the Kim-Ohira meeting on a secret level. 
245 Tanida Seikyu et al., 1966, p.25. Those precidents were set by the second United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in March to April, 1960. Also this source mentioned 
the precedence of fishery agreement between Great Britain and Nordic countries around this 
period; This point was also confirmed by Confidential Source #6. 
246 Morita Yoshio, 1991, p. 273-4 
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through an arrangement made by Yatsugi Kazuo, in November 1963 . 
Sato, although not in the Ikeda government then, urged the 
conclusion of the treaty within the year.247 In March 1964, a meeting of 
Japanese and South Korean Agricultural Ministers was held. However, 
real progress was not made until the second meeting of Agricultural 
Ministers in March 1965, due to the South Korean fear of Japanese 
domination of Japan Sea fishing resources.248 
Japanese domestic perspectives had a significant influence on the 
Japanese negotiating position during this period.249 Political interests 
were especially influential in promoting political intervention after 
July 1962, as seen in the Kim-Ohira meeting. Political involvement in 
the negotiating process had made a significant and positive impact on 
progress.250 The previous lack of political involvement was due to 
caution on the part of the ruling party arising from Prime Minister 
Kishi's forced resignation following widespread public demonstrations 
against the conclusion of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. 
Politicians were unwilling to risk the same level of objections being 
raised against any normalisation agreement with South Korea. 
However, Cabinet Research Office polling in 1963 showed that over 30 
per cent of Japanese didn't even know about the negotiations. By 
September 1965, following the normalisation and prior to its 
ratification by the Diet, a similar poll indicated that 58.9 per cent of 
Japanese had no opinion about the treaty, 10.8 per cent opposed it and 
Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 280 247 
248 Tanida Seikyu et al., 1966, p.24. South Korea was particularly concerned about the 
differences in fishing capabilities between Japanese and South Korean fishing boats; the 
Japanese boats being superior and capable of larger catches. 
249 Although Confidential Source #6 "does not recall much more than the fact that some 
politicians and interest groups expressed their interest in this issue," he briefed those upon 
request. It shows that there was an increasing interest in the normalisation issue from different 
interest groups . 
250 Confidential Source #5 admitted that political intervention in the form of the Ohira-
Kim meeting, was 'effective' in terms of solving the biggest obstacle in the negotiations. 
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30.8 per cent agreed with it. These data indicate that most of the 
population were not strongly opposed to the treaty.251 
The appointment of Sugi Michisuke, chairman of the Japan External 
Trade Organisation, to the head of negotiating team suggests the 
increasing influence of the business community on the negotiations 
and indicates an increasing willingness to settle the issue. 252 Business 
groups started to be actively interested in the negotiations. Teramoto 
has commented that; "It was since the establishment of the Park 
government that economic cooperation between Japan and South 
Korea became activated."253 Nihon keizai chosa kyogikai (Japan 
Economic Research Council) published a report called Kankokukeizai 
no genjyo (The Present Situation of South Korea Economy) at the end 
of 1963. The report emphasised the advantages of Japanese companies 
utilising cheap labour in South Korea for developing high value added 
products. 254 
Mindan's activities might also have had some impact on the 
negotiating position of the Japanese government.255 The Park regime 
also "strengthened its ties with the pro-South Koreans in Japan" .256 
After 1964, pro-South Korean businessmen led by Mindan director 
Kwon Il, were invited by Park Chung Hee to visit South Korea. After 
this, Mindan decided to cooperate with the Park Chung Hee 
251 Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, Nikkan joyaku o meguru naigai no dok°' 
Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, Tokyo, 1966, p.160 
252 Confidential Source #5 denied any direct influence by the business community on the 
negotiating position, but said that 'Sugi might have had contacts with the business 
comm unity'. 
253 Teramoto Mitsuro, 'Nikkan keizai kyoryoku wa do shinten suruka', in Asahi Janaru, 
May 16, 1965, p. 13 
254 Teramoto Mitsuro, 1965, p. 15 
255 Confidential Source #5 was convinced that there was no influence by the activities of 
Koreans in Japan, on the Japanese negotiating position. He did suggest that those activities had 
an influence on the South Korean negotiating position and, in this way, may have influenced 
the process. 
256 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 152 
74 
government in implementing its first Five Year Economic Plan.257 The 
competition between Chosoren and Mindan "for the allegiance of the 
Korean minority in Japan" continued during 1962 and intensified 
towards the end of 1963, before the presidential elections in South 
Korea in 1963.258 
At this time, the anti-normalisation movement in South Korea 
became a serious threat to the Park regime which had returned to 
quasi-civilian control following elections on December 17, 1963. The 
Japanese government was very supportive of the Park regime as they 
saw its tight political control of the nation as being favourable to a 
reasonable settlement. From the Japanese perspective, the regime 
could, more so than previous Korean administrations, ignore public 
opinion if the settlement was not as good from the Korean perspective. 
The Japanese government announced a US$100 million loan to South 
Korea from Japan before the normalisation in order to assist the Park 
regime, by demonstrating that it had wrung a concession from the 
Japanese.259 The negotiations progressed, but were terminated on April 
6, 1964 by anti-normalisation student demonstrations in Seoul.260 
Despite political, business and community interest in the 
normalisation during the negotiation, the legitimacy crisis of Park 
regime was serious enough to terminate the negotiations. However, 
those domestic influences in Japan were significant in promoting the 
negotiation, at this stage. 
4.3. Seventh Round Talks and the Conclusion of the Treaty 
257 ibid., p. 152. Park promised Kwtn 11 that "South Korea would do everything possible 
to advance the interests of the Koreans in Japan" . 
258 ibid., p. 155, 156 
259 Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 97 
260 Gendaishi Kenkyusho, op. cit., p. 2; see also Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p . 8 
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American pressure to finalise the normalisation negotiations 
increased considerably after the American commitment to the 
Vietnam War escalated following the Gulf of Tonkin crisis on August 
3, 1964.261 Sato Eisaku, who took over as Prime Minister after Ikeda 
resigned on the grounds of illness on November 9, 1964, visited the 
United States and promised to enforce the rapprochement. American 
pressure on Japan was reinforced by the decision of South Korea on 
January 18, 1965 to send 2000 soldiers to Vietnam to back the American 
effort to support the South Vietnamese regime. A Second meeting of 
Japanese and Sou th Korean Agricultural Ministers was held from 
March 3. 
South Koreans initially stressed the disadvantages South Koreans 
fishermen would suffer after the abolition of the 'Peace Line'. Japanese, 
on the other hand, suggested a more 'realistic measure for fishery 
restriction', such as a 12 sea mile fishery line, considering the actual 
amount of fishing engaged in by Japanese. The South Koreans 
responded by showing readiness to accept this Japanese idea.262 Apart 
from the 12 sea mile fishery line, inclusion of fishery cooperation and 
approximately US$30 million in economic cooperation agreed at 
Ohira-Kim meeting was suggested.263 On March 18, Secretary of State 
Rusk and the head of the Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry made a 
261 Sakamoto Yoshikazu, op. cit., p. 54. He argued that the United States "made an 
extraordinary effort to bring about early normalization of Japanese-Korean relations during the 
last two weeks of September 1964." This was because; "The United States openly attempted to 
facilitate normalization talks at that particular time, not simply because the Park regime faced a 
serious financial crisis, but more significantly because enormous Sino-American tensions had 
arisen following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and because Washington anticipated 
that China would conduct a nuclear test in the autumn". Also Confidential Source #5. Almost 
all the primary sources interviewed showed hesitancy in talking about the American influence 
on the negotiating position. However, this source said that Americans seemed to have often 
contacted the Japanese through embassies in regard to the negotiations, although denying the 
direct interference of America. This would support the view that the United States took a 
steady interest in the issue and that the Japanese were sensitive to their interests. However, it 
is difficult to guage the degree of influence from these sources . 
262 Tanida Seikyu et al., 1966, p.25-26 
263 ibid., p.57 
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joint communique on early rapprochement between South Korea and 
Japan. On May 16,1965, Park Chung Hee met United States President 
Johnson and promised South Korean assistance for the United States 
in its involvement in the Vietnam War and the early conclusion of a 
normalisation treaty with Japan. 
The establishment of the Sato government on November 9, 1964, sped 
up the negotiations. The Seventh Round Talks were opened on 
December 3, 1964. A meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Sato 
and South Korean Prime Minister Chon Il Kwon was held on February 
6, 1965. In February, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shina also visited 
South Korea. Shina made an apologetic announcement on his arrival 
that; "It was very sad that there was an unhappy period in the l<?ng 
history of Japan and South Korea, and I deeply regret it."264 Shina, on 
the authority of Prime Minister Sato, succeeded in reaching an 
agreement with the South Korean Foreign Minister to sign an interim 
normalisation treaty.265 Thus, the interim treaty was signed on 
February 20,1965 in Seoul. The extensive negotiations for concluding 
the treaty itself were carried out by both Japanese and South Korean 
officials266, and these were followed by the conclusion of other specific 
treaties on June 22 at the Japanese Prime Minister's residence in Tokyo. 
The Japanese interests reflected in the negotiation of the Seventh 
Round Talks were overwhelmingly political, as seen in the visits and 
264 
265 
Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 9 
ibid., pp. 9-11 
266 Confidential Source #5 said that despite the resolution of the South Korean property 
claim by the Ohira-Kim meeting in 1962, negotiations continued even to the stage of the 
wording of the treaty, which still revealed conflict over issues such as the basic relations 
between Japan and South Korea, the legal status of Koreans in Japan and the fishery 
agreement. Especially in respect of the issues concerning Japanese colonisation of Korea, there 
was a conflict of interests. South Korea wanted to state that Japanese colonialism had been 
illegal since the signing of the Treaty of Protection (hogo joyaku) forced on Korea in 1905, but 
Japan maintained that it was legal. They settled on wording that the colonialisation was 
'already null and void'; also Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 320-322, 328-343. Because of this 
negotiation after the Ohira-Kim meeting, South Korea succeeded in increasing the $US100 
million low interest, long term, officially approved investment loans from private sources 
promised at the meeting to $US300 million. 
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announcements of United States, Japanese and South Korean 
politicians. Also, the influence of business groups is evident in the 
Japanese negotiating position. The Japanese representatives in the 
negotiating team for the Seventh Round Talks included Takasugi 
Shin'ichi, an adviser to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and also the 
chairman of the Keidanren Committee on Economic Co-operation.267 
Also, a general research organisation for business groups in Japan, 
Nihon keizai chosa kyogikai (Japan Economic Research Council) was 
responsible for designing the Japan-South Korea economic cooperation 
framework.268 
Apart from the political and economic interest, there was an interest in 
the normalisation from Defence Agency. This military interest was 
reflected in Mitsuya Kenkya (Research on the Three Arrows Scenario), 
which was completed in 1963. This 1419 page research paper was a 
strategic plan which hypothesises an attack by North Korea, and a 
Japanese, South Korean and United States response to this attack.269 
The Defence Ministry was also interested in access to strategic 
information on North Korea provided by South Korean military forces 
after the normalisation.270 This interest was in line with the American 
concern to integrate its allied defence mechanism in Asia.271 Although 
267 In conducting this research, officials of Keidanren were contacted. When questioned, 
these officials maintained that the negotiation was 'a government' matter, and Keidanren did 
not have anything to do with it. However, the existence of the 'economic cooperation' bureau 
in Keidanren , as well as Takasugi's presence in the negotiation team, could only mean that the 
economic community's interests were reflected both through formal and informal 
participation in the treaty process. This issue of Keidanren's role is worthy of further research; 
see also Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 310 
268 Nakagawa Nobuo (b), 'Kankoku keizai no genjitsu to keizai kyoryoku', in Gendai no 
me, October 1965, p. 79 
269 Fujishima Udai (b), 'Mitsuya kenkyu sono shirarezaru bubun', in Gendai no me, April 
1965, pp. 124-125 
270 
271 
'The comment by General Yoshie Sei-ichi' in Chosen Kenkyu, vol. 41, July 1965, p. 45 
Hatada Shigeo (b), 'Nikkan kaidan to bei kyokuto senryaku', in Ajia afurika koza III 
nihon to chosen, ed Hatada Takashi, Keiso shobo, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 124-125. He quotes the 
comment by United States Assistant Secretary for Defense, Gil Patrick, that the United States 
expected Japan to fill the gap in the northeast Pacific in time for United States troops to be 
mobilised to deal with regional disputes. He also cites Patrick as saying that the United States 
expects Japan to develop naval power sufficient to protect the Korean Peninsula. McCormack 
78 
the military alliance between Japan and South Korea did not require 
the normalisation of diplomatic relations, since it was established by 
the security alliances between Japan and United States in 1951 and 
between South Korea and United States in 1954, the military interest of 
the Japanese Defence Agency might have had some impact in 
promoting the normalisation issue, particularly within the right wing 
of the LDP which supported the Pusan akahata ran (Red Flags in Pusan 
Theory). 
The lack of support for opposition parties who advocated the anti-
normalisation activities, was also one of the reasons for the Liberal 
Democratic Party to conclude the treaty. According to Naikaku kanbo 
naikaku chosashitsu (Cabinet Research Office), the anti-normalisation 
movement failed due to the split between Sohyo (The Federation of 
Labour Unions), Socialist Party and Communists.272 They split because 
of a conflict which arose from the Sino-USSR dispute. Anpo kokumin 
kaigi (the Anti-Japan-United States Security Treaty Forum), which 
continued the movement from 1960, succeeded in getting 100,000 
signatures for submission to the Diet to petition it not to noramlise 
relations with South Korea. However, its attention shifted to anti-
nuclear issues due to American nuclear submarine movements 
through Japan, and so, its power in respect of the normalisation issue 
declined after its peak in 1963.273 
and Halliday comment that; " William Bundy, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of state, is on 
record as saying that if activity broke out again on the 38th Parallel, 'this time the Japanese 
army goes.' in Halliday, Jon and McCormack, Gavan, Japanese Imperialism Today Co-
Prosperity in Greater East Asia, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 100 
272 Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, Nikkan jyoyaku teiketsu o meguru naigai no 
doko, Naikaku kanbo naikaku chosashitsu, 1966, p. 23 
273 Hatada Shigeo (c), 'Nikkan kaidan hantai toso no tenkai to sono rekishiteki yakuwari', 
in Ajia afurika koza III nihon to chci5en, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keiso shobo, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 192-
197 
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The lack of interest from intellectuals, despite objections by some, also 
failed to inhibit the conclusion of the treaty. Five prominent 
intellectuals; Abe Tomoji(an author), Kobayashi Naoki(a lawyer), 
Nakano Yoshio(a social critic), Nogamo Shigekichiro(a physicist), and 
Hidaka Rokuro(sociologist), attempted to unite the labour unions, the 
socialists and the communists, but failed.274 Anpo hihan no kai (the 
Association to Criticise the Japan-United States Security Treaty), an 
organisation of intellectuals, published a pamphlet Shiranai ma ni -
nikkan kaidan no motarasumono - (While You Are Ignorant About 
It- the Possible Consequences of Japanese-South Korean 
Normalisation) - on October 10, 1962, and sold 10,000 copies. This 
organisation also held a symposium on October 16 the same year, 
mobilising 400 people. This demonstrated a resounding lack of interest 
by the public in the intellectual lobby against the treaty. The issue of 
American nuclear submarine visiting Japan affected the intellectuals' 
opinions, too and diverted their attention from the normalisation 
issue. Nine scientists, including Yukawa Hideki, a Nobel laureat in 
physics, made an announcement on March 25, 1965, opposing United 
States nuclear submarine visiting Japan, but this appears to have had 
not substantial impact on the normalisation treaty negotiations.275 
Anti-normalisation movements did not probably have much appeal to 
the ordinary people, who might have supported Ikeda and Sato' s 
economic policy and 'friendship' with a neighbouring country. 
274 Hirotsu Kyosuke, 'Nikkan jyoyaku hijyun hantai toso no jittai' in Toki no kadai, 
October 1965, p. 17-18 
275 Hatada Shigeo (c), op. cit., p. 192 
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5: CONCLUSION 
Major turning points in the Japanese negotiating position seemed to 
have occurred when the 'Clark Line' was abolished in 1953, when 
Kishi came in power in 1957, and when Prime Minister Ikeda 
solidified his base after the elections in July 1962. 
When the 'Clark Line' was abolished and the capture of Japanese 
fishermen and fishing boats escalated there was considerable domestic 
political pressure to resolve this issue. The Japanese prime interest in 
the negotiation then became the fisheries issue. 276 The second change 
in the Japanese negotiating position was provoked by the 
establishment of the Kishi government which wanted to resolve the 
normalisation issue quickly. A pro-United States stance and an interest 
in South Korea as a buffer zone for Japanese security were shared by 
both Kishi and Ikeda. Kishi pursued those objectives by concluding the 
Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960, but following the large 
scale anti-Security Treaty movement and the subsequent resignation of 
Kishi, Ikeda was forced to be more cautious in his approach to the 
issue. His victory in the election of July 1962 solidified his political base 
and enabled him to take more active measures. This third change in 
the negotiating position of the Japanese government brought the 
negotiations to a political level, resulting in the Ohira-Kim 
Memorandum of November 1962. Through this, the biggest obstacle to 
normalisation, the issue of property claims, was thus eliminated. It 
was then only a matter of time for South Korea to give up the 'Peace 
Line', a severe provocation to the Japanese, following this agreement. 
276 Confidential Source #5 said that 'all the issues' were important for the conclusion of 
the normalisation treaty. The influence of the massive capture of Japanese vessels and 
fishermen by South Korea on the attitude of politicians was obvious. Probably, given the 
general attitude of the bureaucracy to the negotiations, the influence of this issue was limited 
to the political level. 
81 
The reason why it took three years for the treaty to be concluded after 
this agreement was: (1) the anti-Japanese feeling of the South Korean 
people; (2) the legitimacy crisis of the Park Chung Hee government; 
and (3) the sensitivity of the Ikeda government to public objections 
following the demonstrations against the ratification of changes to the 
Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960. The American influence 
in helping suppress the South Korean anti-normalisation 
movement277 and its support for the Park regime in its normalising 
relations with Japan, was therefore significant in enabling the 
conclusion of the treaty in June 1965. 
An examination of American influence on the negotiating position of 
the Japanese government, makes it apparent that at the most basic 
level, (1) United States East Asian policy consistently sought the 
normalisation of bilateral relations between the two nations, (2) the 
American role in the negotiation process was as an intermediary 
between Japan and South Korea, and (3) United States East Asian 
policy was significant in that it provided a framework for Japanese and 
South Korean bilateral policies. 
However, it is also evident that the intermediary role of the United 
States was often manipulated by both Japan and South Korea. This 
might be explained by Japan and South Korea fighting for United 
States support for economic development and re-integration into the 
international community. It is quite obvious that whereas American 
influence on the normalisation process was consistent, it also waxed 
and waned. It would be simplistic to see the American role as one of 
the United States instructing its client states, Japan and South Korea, to 
277 Kirn Dong-Jo, op. cit., p.290. According to Kirn Dong-Jo, Bundy said that US 
Ambassador Brown would 'convince' the opposition to understand the necessity of resolving 
the normalisation issue. 
82 
conclude a treaty. If this was the case, the treaty would have been 
concluded at the same time as the Japan-Republic of China 
Normalisation Treaty which was commenced at the same time as the 
Japan-Republic of Korea Normalisation Treaty and concluded after one 
year. However, this was not the case. 
American influence vacillated depending on a number of factors: the 
domestic situation in Japan and South Korea; the nature of the current 
American Administration; the influence of particular international 
strategic events ( especially United States involvement in Korea and 
Vietnam); the strength of the United States, Korean, Japanese and 
international economies, and the willingness of the South Korean and 
Japanese administrations in co-operating with the United States. Any 
American influence must be seen within the context of the bilateral 
relationship between South Korea and Japan, including its historical 
aspects, and as being limited by the strong domestic influences, 
including the bureaucratic and domestic political factors operating 
within both those nations. 
It cannot be denied that Japanese and South Korean policies were 
formed on the basis of their ties with the United States both militarily 
and economically. However, American influence on Japan and South 
Korea on the normalisation issue was limited by Japan and South 
Korea struggling for United States' intervention on their behalf. When 
the United States supported one side, the other side often criticised it 
or simply avoided reaching an agreement. Therefore, American 
influence was not so effective in those areas where the interests of 
Japan and South Korea were in conflict, such as the property claims 
issue. The United States therefore principally exerted its influence 
indirectly. The shift of United States East Asian policy around 1960 to 
83 
reduce its financial support for South Korea and Japan substantially 
changed the South Korean stance. The agreement on the property 
claim was reached at the time as South Korea needed to secure 
economic support which it could do so by compromising with Japan 
and thus opening its economy to more Japanese investment and trade. 
The major influences on the Japanese negotiating position were 
political objectives and the interpretation by the bureaucracy, especially 
the Foreign, Finance and Justice Ministries of the national interest. 
The negotiating position was determined by Japanese East Asian policy 
objectives, economic development of Japan, as well as by the interests 
of politicians and bureaucrats. From the beginning of the negotiations 
to the emergence of the Kishi government, the interests of politicians 
and bureaucrats were shared, i.e. to minimise payments associated 
with imperialist expansion and the war so as to bring about an early 
economic recovery. However, the interests of these two groups came 
into conflict during the Kishi government; Kishi promoting the 
negotiations, while bureaucrats resisted it. The conflict was resolved in 
the 1960s when the objectives of both politicians and bureaucrats were 
united under the banner of further economic development by 
establishing full economic relations with South Korea. 
Non-government influences on the Japanese negotiating position 
were provided by business groups, intellectuals, and community 
groups. The negotiating position of the government from after the 
Korean War to around 1960, shows that Japanese interest groups were 
beginning to have a periodically significant effect on Japanese foreign 
policy. The capture of fishermen and fishing boats by South Korea is 
the strongest example, and Chosoren (The Association of North 
84 
Koreans Resident in Japan)' s activity to effect the repatriation of 
Koreans to DPRK also had a significant effect during this period. 
After the regime change in South Korea in 1960 began promoting a 
more pro-Japanese atmosphere, Japanese business interest in South 
Korea had a significant impact on the negotiating position of the 
Japanese government, which appointed businessmen as 
representatives of the negotiating teams at both the Sixth and Seventh 
Round Talks. However, the activities by Koreans in Japan to improve 
their treatment and the political and intellectual opposition to the 
normalisation had little impact on the negotiating position of the 
Japanese government. 
After evaluating the influences of United States East Asian policy, 
South Korean and Japanese domestic issues on the Japanese 
negotiating position in the process of finalising the normalisation 
treaty, it can be concluded that: 
• American policy influence was consistent and varied in strength 
over the course of the negotiation process. It established an 
international policy framework for the negotiations, but was not 
pre-eminent in influencing the course of the negotiations. The 
American concentration on developing the Japanese economy and 
establishing an economically and militarily strong Japan as the 
centre of its East Asian policy in the 1950's weakened as Japan 
refused the larger role the United States tried to force on it. In the 
1960s, Japan's refusal to go along with the Pacific security alliance, 
the purposeful limitations it placed on its armed forces, its 
reluctance to fully meet the cost of American bases in Japan, 
contrasted with the Korean willingness to maintain strong 
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domestic military forces, to actively participate in American 
strategic initiatives and to provide troops for the Vietnam War. 
These changes in the bilateral relations between the United States 
and its two allies also influenced the nature of American pressure 
to resolve the normalisation issue. 
• Direct American influence on Japanese politicians was weak.278 
Although there is substantial evidence that the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency provided funds to particular politicians 
(including Kishi and Sato among others), the nature of Japanese 
politics and the highly f actionalised nature of the LDP, could not 
guarantee any substantial consistent influence over the domestic 
political agenda, which was, in any case, very conservative. 
• Japanese politicians played a major role in the most crucial period 
of the negotiations. If the negotiations had been left to bureaucrats, 
it could have taken much more time to settle the negotiations, 
since their interest was in winning as perfect a bargain as possible 
for Japan, on property claims, the fishery issue and the issue of the 
legal status of Koreans in Japan.279 On the other hand, appreciation 
of the political situation in South Korea, of American strategic and 
economic needs as well as an understanding of Japanese domestic 
demands encouraged politicians to utilise the opportunity provided 
278 Even the American interpretation of San Francisco Treaty Article 4 in 1957 was not 
influencial enough to settle the negotiation. Probably it was the most influencial of the direct 
interventions made by the United States as Confidential Source #5 said; also Confidential 
Source #6 said that they "took American East Asian policy into consideration when making 
Japanese policies, but were not influenced by it." 
279 Confidential Source #6 said that the prime interest for 'them' was in the Japanese 
national interest, which stressed; "(1) political stability in Japan, as well as pursuit of the 
economic interests of Japan; and (2) maintaining friendly relations with the United States." 
Bureaucrats were probably aware of the necessity to compromise, in order to pursue (2), but 
were unwilling to compromise on (1). This dilemma might have resulted in them leaving the 
crucial negotiations to the politicians and supporting those initiatives. 
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by the coincidence of a number of interests for Japan to conclude the 
normalisation treaty. 
Regime changes in South Korea and the development of the South 
Korean economy were influential in determining the rate of the 
negotiations. The development of the South Korean economy 
became a particularly important, indirect influence on the Japanese 
government as interest grew among business groups to increase 
investment in South Korea and to draw South Korea into the zone 
of projection of the Japanese economy as it accelerated in the 1960s. 
It is also obvious that South Korean domestic political and 
economic issues had an important bearing on the way Japan 
negotiated the treaty. Although some of these issues, and Japanese 
reactions to them, have been indicated, their fuller examination is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Domestic influences on the negotiation process changed over the 
course of the talks. In the early years to 1960, the process was 
essentially controlled by the bureaucrats, particularly the Foreign 
Ministry and the Finance Ministry.280 Community, academic and 
business influences were few, if any, and had no noticeable effects 
on the negotiation process. This changed when the fisheries 
problems arising from the 'Peace Line' became a domestic political 
issue, prompting politicians to become more involved. Shortly 
280 Johnson. Chalmers, 1975, pp. 79. It was characteristic of these ministries that they 
followed a particularly bureacratic view of the outcomes they wanted from the negotiations 
and that in pursuing these, political and community viewpoints were basically ignored as has 
been demonstrated. This dominance by the bureaucracy is characteristic of a political system in 
which politicians are traditionally reactive rather than proactive, a view which is also 
demonstrated by the lack of political initiative in progressing the negotiations until the 
fisheries issue had a political impact. This dominance of the bureacracy in the policy domain is 
well documented, particularly by Johnson. " ... in the 1950s and 1960s, the bureaucrats knew 
more about public policy than the politicians ... as a result the tradition developed that the 
politicians reign but the bureaucrats rule." Therefore, the power of the various ministries in 
controlling the negotiotions cannot be underestimated. However, because of their 
unwillingness to admit other viewpoints in the negotiations, no progress could be made on 
the major obstacle of the property claim until political intervention had occurred. 
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after, an increasing interest in South Korea on the part of 
Keidanren stimulated business interest in normalisation. It was 
therefore only in the latter part of the process that broader domestic 
influences came to bear on the negotiation process. 
We can therefore conclude that while United States East Asian policy 
was an influence on the negotiation process, it was not the dominant 
influence and was, sometimes, subject to both South Korean and 
Japanese domestic political imperatives as detailed above. 
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List of Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials - Survey Respondents 
(Names in Alphabetical order) 
Funayama Shokichi 
Iseki Yujiro 
Maeda Toshikazu 
Nakagawa Toru 
Nishimura Kenjiro 
Uyama Atsushi 
Vice Minister of Ministry of 
Finance (1st round talks) 
Immigration Bureau Chief of 
Ministry of Justice (4th round 
talks) and Asian Bureau Chief of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(4th 
round talks - after spring 1959, 5th 
and 6th round talks) 
Northeast Asian Bureau Chief of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(6th 
round talks), He was also 
involved in the negotiation from 
the preparatory round talks as a 
research officer of Ministry's 
Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. He was working for Iseki 
Yujiro. 
Treaties Bureau Chief of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (5th and 6th 
round talks). He was involved in 
the negotiation throughout the 
entire rounds of talks. He dealt 
with all the issues. 
Vice Minister of Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries. (4th round talks) 
Secretary in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (5th round talks) and a 
research officer in the Minister's 
Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.(6th round talks). He was 
in charge of fishery issue. He was 
also working for Iseki Yujiro. 
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APPENDIX2 
The General Questionnaire Sent to All Respondents 
(Japanese original) 
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The General Questionnaire Sent to All Respondents 
(English translation) 
1. In the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation negotiations, in 
which rounds of talks did you participate? 
2. What was your role in the normalisation negotiations? 
3. 
4. 
From your viewpoint, what were the issues which Japan wanted 
to resolve the most, or which were pursued most strongly? 
Was there any occasion when you felt that the Japanese 
negotiating position was influenced by politicians, ministries, 
interest groups, academics, etcetera? If so, which issue was it? 
What did these interests demand? 
5. If you answered no to the above, and felt that the Japanese 
negotiating position was never influenced by any of those 
groups or individuals, is there any particular reason why you 
feel that way? 
6. The general academic interpretation of Japan-Republic of Korea 
normalisation is that the Japanese government's negotiating 
position was mostly influenced by America's East Asian policies. 
Do you agree? If so, why? 
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APPENDIX3 
A. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Uyama Atsushi 
(Japanese original) 
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A. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Uyama Atsushi 
(English translation) 
1. Did you participate in the normalisation negotiations other than 
at the: 
• 5th round talks - October 25, 1960 to May 16, 1961 (as Secretary 
in Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
• 6th round talks - October 20, 1961 to April 6, 1994 (as a research 
officer in the Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and as the chief for reparation issues) 
2. I suppose that your main task were the negotiations for 
resolution of the reparations issue. Did you participate in 
negotiations other than this? If so, what were they? 
3. From your experience in participating in the negotiations on the 
reparations issue, what were the issues which Japan most 
stressed during the negotiations? 
• Was the Japanese side hoping to settle the reparations issue 
and the issue of the 'Peace Line' at the same time during the 
Fifth Round talks? 
• The Japanese side did not seem to be enthusiastic about 
resolving issues at the Reparation Committee during the Fifth 
Round talks. Is that because the Chan Myon regime's instability? 
Or because of the amount of reparations the Republic of Korea 
required was unacceptable to Japan? (In that case, was the 
problem simply the amount of reparations, or the Korean 
position on receiving reparation for Japan's colonialism?) 
• During the Sixth round talks, the negotiation was almost 
terminated when it became clear that the negotiating position, 
especially on the issue of reparations, of Japan and Korea were 
very different. Was this due to the same problem as in the Fifth 
Round talks, on which the positions of both sides conflicted? Or 
had the focus shifted because of the regime change in Korea? 
• What were the issues for inclusion in the reparations 
negotiations after the political agreement by Foreign Minister 
Ohira and the KCIA division head Kim in the Autumn of 
1963? (Did the Japanese maintain the position of solving the 
fishery problem at the same time as normalisation, and to not 
give reparations to Korea as a compensation for colonisation? If 
so, how did the Korean side react to this Japanese position?) 
108 
• Was there any effort to reach a political agreement before the 
Autumn of 1963? Or was this the first attempt at such an 
agreement? 
4. Do you think that the Japanese negotiating position was 
influenced by particular individuals or organisations? 
• The Japanese business community began to have an interest in 
Korea after the demise of the Rhee regime. Did you take into 
consideration the economic benefit for Japan which would be 
brought by the normalisation? 
• Were you influenced by any economic community groups 
visiting Korea, conducting investigation, or issuing statements? 
• Were you influenced by, or felt it necessary to settle issues 
early, because of the detention of fishermen, or by the statements 
of fishery organisations? 
5. The United States supported the Japan-Republic of Korea 
normalisation process from the beginning. Were you conscious 
of the American East Asian policy, especially during the later 
half of the Sixth Round talks and Seventh Round talks? 
6. The general academic interpretation of the Japan-Republic of 
Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's 
negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East 
Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why? 
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B. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nishimura Kenjiro 
(Japanese original) 
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3 . i! ~re~~ t1) ~ 7!> ""t"· ~· 5 ! Ill ~ n t<": r!§ l1 ti iJ, 6 iJJ. -r . t 0) ~ li ""c· B * f8JJ iJ,· ~ 
t,ffl<~~t,k§c~ct1)J?~t,t1)~~kt1)~LJ:?~? 
* ~~,R~~ ~~r,,, Lt<": t1) (ct. 5.!~ra~~O"J~5~ ~ B *-fJfiliJ,~ < ~Iv -r· c.,, t<": 
iJ\ 6 ti' c ffl t, ~ °9 iJ,· , c ? -r· l, J: ? iJ\ ? 
* ~PB,R~t~O"J~fl:,,(c: &St<":~ -r, B*(~x;t~OOft~~~i*il~~~ t, -rt,~ 
9iJ,', ~ h(ct, 5!~rc,~O)~)~i)\~~~i* J 'J t,ffi:~1'.:·&S ~ t<":"/J\ 6ti' c,~C.,\ 
~ °9 tf , c ? -r· l, J: ? iJ, ? 
* ~PB ,R~~~ iJ,'ti ~ ~ -c =F~G L -r ~00 iijlj iJ,'fi1~Hi ~ ;r- °9 J ? (C: :tJ ~ tL. 
c {,\ h n -r C.,\ ~ °9 t),, c? l, -r ti'~ tL O"J ""c· l, J: ? iJ,? ( B :f:.f.~ljt),'~l*fflflJrc~ 
~(c:? e.., -ruoo O)~* ~~(t J\n ~~~ti·~ tL tJ, 6 ""c· l, J: ? n\? ) 
* i*~'PO"J3 4$2 ~tJ, 6B*t~J(~, ~tfflffifA 1J~~(c:fi1i'li~;r- L-rt,~ 
9 tJ,. B u~ ~ ~ 0) ~w (~ ~ 'J ~ l, tL tJ, ? 
* ~~:tt'P (;: (~~5-!;n,·~ c ~ 6 ~ t, c ~~ ;l (;: ~ 'J ~ l, t<": tJ,? (f.R BB~~ 
R~~JU~*·~~O"J~~~~e~6i/J.-c) 
4. ~~OJ~~~- M~O)~A. ~~~e~6~~(1)ft~. ~it~~~~n 
k~c~&S'J~Lk~? 
* 5!~1\flif°*OJW~ ct,?~~, 5!~*ff,g-OJ ~ 1JJ(c: J ~ -C, ~7J;~*6 ~ .:& 
tJ,' ti ~ ~ 6 tJ t, , c t, ? ti 1J ~ W ~ ~ (t t<": ~ c iJ,' 93 'J ~ l, tL fJ\ ? 
* ~tffiffif A 1Jw}ii(~. R5ae~5~fffi ti·~ tL (1) -r· L J: :::i '!J, o ~ n c t, a u~5!icc: 
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B. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nishimura Kenjiro 
(English translation) 
1. Did you participate in the normalisation negotiations other than 
at the: 
• 4th round talks - April 15, 1958 to April 19, 1960 - (as Vice 
Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) 
2. I suppose that your main task were the negotiations on the 
fishery issue. Did you participate in negotiations other than this? 
3. From your experience in participating in the negotiations on the 
fishery issue, what were the issues which Japan most stressed 
during the negotiations? 
• Did Japan reopen the negotiation by initiating the Fourth 
Round talks because it was considered necessary to solve the 
fishery problem? 
• Japan abandoned the right to claim Japanese property left in 
Korea in opening the Fourth Round talks. Was this because 
solving the fishery problem was considered more important 
than the property claim? 
• It is said that the Korean side seemed cooperative about six 
months after the Fourth Round talks began. Why was this? (Do 
you think that it is because Japan showed flexibility on the 
reparations issue or showed signs of accepting the Korean 
demands?) 
• Japan showed interest in sending Koreans resident in Japan to 
the DPRK during the recession in the negotiations after February 
1959. Was the normalisation process influenced by this? 
• Did you think that the normalisation process was difficult 
during the Rhee regime? (Because of anti-Japanese policies and 
the huge amount of reparations claimed?) 
4. Do you think that the Japanese negotiating position was 
influenced by a particular individual or organisations? 
• Were you influenced, or felt it necessary to settle issues early, 
because of the detention of fishermen, or by the statements of 
fishery organisations? 
• Was the sending of Koreans resident in Japan to the DPRK 
political decision? Or was it part of the Japanese negotiation 
strategy? 
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• Were there any political agreements between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea concerning the normalisation? 
• Were you influenced during the negotiations by the activities 
or statements of Mindan, Chosoren academics, citizen's groups, 
or political parties? 
5. The United States supported the Japan-Republic of Korea 
normalisation process from the beginning. Were you conscious 
of the American East Asian policy, especially during the Fourth 
Round talks? 
6. The general academic interpretation of the Japan-Republic of 
Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's 
negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East 
Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why? 
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C. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nakagawa Toru 
(Japanese original) 
~ L t,nra,~~ 
1 , B ~~~~(Z.15 t, t, ct=iJll~(ct!,ltiiX~~~ (B~JD 3 5 ~ 1 0 ~ 2 5 B tJ\ 6 
~$(J)5~16B) cffl~~~~<~~36~10~20B~6~~39~ 
4 J:3 6 B) (z., ~ ti ~·ti ?'~fi-ti ~*i}aj.Jt c l, t ~1JD ~ ti tc:: c flt,% 1" ;n,·, z:: 
(!)ff!! (z. t> faJ 6 tJ\ O)fff·t:·~~(z. ~tJa ~ti% L tc:: tJ\ ? 
2 , ~~~ (z. 15 (t Q ct=i J II~ 0) 1'f fi (ct, c 0) J= :> tJ. t, 0) ti ~ tc:: (J) -r:::· L J: ? tJ\ ? 
<~~~~- ~*oo~~~- ~*m~~1"~tO)~~~fflh6tik(J)~LJ: 
? i)\ ? ) 
s. ~n~~~- ~~~~~~B*~~~t,~<~~Lk~c~, tti~n 
c 0) J= ? tJ. t, (J) ti ~ tc:: 0) -r· l, J: ? i)\ ? 
* ~ni~~~- ~~,~~~t ti ~·ti (z.15 t, t. B *-LDJJ(c.t:5!~ra,~(J)~5~ ~ 
~ t, ~Iv ""t:· t'• tc:: (f) ""t:· l, J: ? "fJ\? t tic t,. 5!~ra,~ c ~i*fflra,~(ctfff}~(z. ~ 
'fl ti' ~ tc:: (J) ""'{:· l, J: ? i)\ ? 
* ~n,~~~(z.15 t, t (ct. B *iijlJ(cta*mra,~ c iJijo!,ra,~ ~-~9l!:~"9 
Q ;: c ~ ~ Iv ""t:· t, tc:: c it\ t, % 1" tJ, . c ? ""t:· l, J: ? tJ\ ? 
* % tc::. ~niR~~O)~l*t15ffi~~ ~""'{:· B *(ct5~1~e~ti' ~ tc:: ct, h ti -c 
t,% 1" tJ,, ;: ti. (ct~~~1f (J)1£~tJ,~~~ ""t:·&5 ~ tc:: tJ\ 6 ""t:· L J: ? "fJ\? t ti. t 
t, . U 00 LijU 0) ~ ~ tJ,· ~ (t A n H t, t, 0) ti· ~ tc:: "fJ\ 6 ""t:· L J: -5 tJ\ ? < t 0) :ti g- . 
~~~- -~~O)~~l,k~~~~k(J)~1°~. ttict,. ~*~~~c1" 
~ tr:tl t-~ 6 fJ. i)\ ~ tc:: i)\ 6 ""'{:· l, J: ? tJ, ? ) 
* ~1',x~~lz. 15 t, t (ct. 3 7 ~0)1JJd.> ~·~%~(ct. ~13t<:ttra,mtz. 00 Lt 
~~(J)~*~~~~<~~~~~~~;:c~~6~~~9. ~~~-~~~ 
O)~~~A~kt~ht~%~~- ;:ti~. ~n~~~O)~t~~~~~? 
t, t:x;ftl:: l, tc:: (J) ""t:" l, J: ? tJ\? th c t, ~1'1-JJ,]'rh ~ tc::;: c (z. J= ~ t. :x;t:rrra, 
~ t> ~ h ~ tc:: 0) -r:: l, J: ? i)\ ? 
* s1~0)tt~*~*ffic~~~ffim~*~~~~*ffl~~(J)~~~~~ 
~ ~ :t,, ~ ti: tt. il*tira,~ (J) ~tffi (ct faf ~ ra,~ (Z. 51! ~ 6 h tc:: 0) "t" l, J: ? tJ\ 0 
<B*OO~. ~~~~cOJ-ffi~S~ttc. ~*~~~cL~~~tt~mff 
114 
1,, 
~· 
,, 
,, 
I 
I 
111 
II 
I 
J 
l 
/I 
~ 
' 
It 
' 
:J 
I 
l, t;:_ (I) -c· l, J: -:> ti, ? ~[!] tijtl (~ ~ h (z. c -:> &Jf; l, t;:_ 0) -c· l, J: ? ti, ? ) 
* s 1 ~ 0) tx .L:J. ti1 (z. t iE5i 5a e~ ~ *a 0) ~ 1J (~ &) ~ ti:.. 0) --r· G J: -:> -tJ, ? t n c t 
J:: ~2 0) ~ ~~ t)\' ~ d.) t ti' ~ ti:.. (J) -r::· t, J: -:> ti\ ? 
4 . ~~ 0) it§li -r::·. ~!~ 0) f~A. @J Pt: tJ c "fJ\ 6 ~ 51> 0) rr_:tij. 1i~t ~ii.ts~ h 
t;:_ ~ c ti 0> 'J ~ l, t;:_ tJ\ ? 
* ~*B~00if0)~5-!,. ~l*:+lra~~tJ ciz.? t,t(l)~[iL tfli2ilc t, ~ t;:_-;fi 
B ~00. fflmfA1111*. ~~*I~*O)~ ~ 1i. ~ ;JJtJ c.· (Z. IJ~ ~~(t ~ t, t;:_ 
ti\ ? 
* ~~ilti\·K.ii~ t, t;:_,t(z.. B~O)*f;1fOOif~ti\·~~(z.!fl!ot~~? ct-:> (z. 
1J ~ti:... c ~ n tit c.,, ~ 9 tJ,. ~i~(Z. 0> ti:..~ t. 00~:iEmH::(z. ct ~ *I~B~flj 
~ ~ ~~~ (Z. ii ti, h ~ l, ti:.. ti, ? 
* ~ h f:>O)*-f51f00if~c1)~~5!iJ1J~, ~_g)fi5!if1J. ~c TJ C(Z.fJ~~~(tt;:_ 
~ c tJ\' &f) 9 ~ l, t;:_ tJ\ ? 
* 5J!~OOif~(J)1JfJ~ ct,-:>~~- 5J!~*£1,g-O) c 11J(z. ct~ t. )(51;~*a~.& 
ti,· tl (~· tJ 6 tJ t, . c t, ? ti tJ I~~ ~ ~ (t t;:_ ~ c ti,· &f) 9 ~ l, t;:_ tJ, ? 
5. r:). 1J 1J (~. a '-20".)00if:iEmit ~~i~31JJtJ, 6~~- ~1i l, -c ~ ti:.. c ,m 
t,~9:1J,. »(z. ~n,x~~O')it=t=. ~-t,x~~O)J.§f£-r::·r:). 1J 1J 0)7:Jr~ 
~ ~~~ ~ h ~ l, t;:_"IJ,? 
6. 8 ~~~(Z. 45 t, t 8 *~,$JO)~~~~, :tz::ti(~ 7;). IJ 1J c1) 7 y·7~~(Z. 
ifi t Jj" ~tit;:_ c <.,,? (1) :IJ,'-fl~O)~~~ c 1J ~ t t, ~ °9 o cpJI 111(~ ~ h (Z. .Fa) 
~h~9~?c-:>Lt~-:>ffihh~cV~9~? 
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C. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nakagawa Toru 
(English translation) 
1. Did you participate in the normalisation negotiations other than 
at the: 
2. 
3. 
• 5th round talks - October 25, 1960 to May 16, 1961 (as the Treaty 
Bureau Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
• 6th round talks - October 20, 1961 to April 6, 1994 (also as the 
Treaty Bureau Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
What were your tasks in the negotiations? (Were you involved 
in all the issues; fishery, basic relations and reparations?) 
From your experience in participating in the negotiations, what 
were the issues which Japan most stressed? 
• Was the Japanese side hoping to resolve the fishery issue most 
of all, during the Fifth and Sixth round talks? Or were the 
fishery issue and the reparations issue of equal importance? 
• Was the Japanese side hoping to settle the reparations issue 
and the 'Peace Line' issue at the same time during the Fifth 
Round talks? 
• The Japanese side did not seem to be enthusiastic about 
resolving issues at the Reparations Committee during the Fifth 
Round talks. Is that because of the Chan Myon regime's 
instability? Or because the amount of reparations the Republic of 
Korea required was unacceptable to Japan? (In that case, was the 
problem simply the amount of reparations, or the Korean 
position on receiving reparation for Japan's colonialism?) 
• During the Sixth round talks, the negotiations were almost 
terminated when it became clear that the negotiating position, 
especially on the issues of reparations, of Japan and Korea were 
very different. Was this due to the same problem as in the Fifth 
Round talks, on which the positions of both sides conflicted? Or 
had the focus shifted because of the regime change in Korea? 
• What were the issues for incl us ion in the reparations 
negotiations after the political agreement by Foreign Minister 
Ohira and the KCIA division head Kim in the Autumn of 
1963?(Did the Japanese maintain the position to solve the 
fishery problem at the same time as the normalisation, and to 
not give reparations to Korea as compensation for the 
colonisation? If so, how did Korean side react to this Japanese 
position?) 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
• Was there any effort to reach a political agreement before the 
Autumn of 1963? Or was that the first time that such an 
agreement was reached? 
Do you think that the Japanese negotiating position was 
influenced by particular individuals or organisations? 
• Were you influenced by a particular individual, or groups, 
when you were negotiating on the issues of basic relations 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea, or on reparations? 
• The Japanese business community began to have an interest in 
Korea after the demise of the Rhee regime. Did you take into 
consideration the economic benefits for Japan which would be 
brought by the normalisation? 
• Were you influenced by any economic community groups 
conducting investigations, or issuing statements? 
• Were you influenced by, or felt it necessary to settle issues 
early, because of the detention of fishermen, or by the statements 
of fishery organisations? 
The United States supported the Japan-Republic of Korea 
normalisation process from the beginning. Were you conscious 
of the American East Asian policy, especially during the later 
half of the Sixth Round talks and Seventh Round talks? 
The general academic interpretation of the Japan-Republic of 
Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's 
negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East 
Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why? 
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